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Chapter 6
Classical models of quantum mechanics
This chapter gives an introduction to a chain of results attempting to exclude deeper
layers underneath quantum mechanics that restore some form of classical physics:
‘[Such results] more or less illustrate the ways along which some opponents might hope to
escape Bohr’s reasonings and von Neumann’s proof and the places where they are danger-
ously near breaking their necks.’ (Groenewold, 1946, p. 454)
In so far as they are mathematically precise, such no-go results have their roots
in von Neumann’s 1932 book, which gave rise to two traditions that were often
in polemical opposition to each other. Mathematically minded authors typically
admired von Neumann’s exclusion of hidden variables, yet tried to strengthen his
theorem by weakening its assumptions; this sparked, for example, Gleason’s Theo-
rem (1957) as well as the Kochen–Specker Theorem (1967). Certain physicists (led
by Bell), on the other hand, tried to circumvent (and later even ridicule) von Neu-
mann’s work. A high point of this tradition was Bell’s Theorem from 1964, which
was informed not only by von Neumann, but even more so by the famous Einstein–
Podolsky–Rosen (EPR) paper from 1935, as well as by Bohm’s deterministic pilot
wave reformulation of quantum mechanics (1952). However, at the end of the day
these traditions turned out to be not really divergent after all: Bell not only indepen-
dently (and earlier) obtained a version of the Kochen–Specker Theorem, but, more
importantly, his results from 1964 turn out to be very closely related to the culmina-
tion of the ﬁrst tradition in the form of the so-called Free Will Theorem (FWT), which
was published by Conway and Kochen during 2006–2008. Indeed, although its va-
lidity is uncontroversial, this theorem has been criticized on the following grounds:
1. Lack of novelty compared with the famous paper by Bell (1964), whose assump-
tions and conclusions are at least quite similar to those of the FWT (although the
underlying proofs are mathematically quite distinct from those in the FWT).
2. Lack of novelty even within its own terms: versions of the FWT had actually been
around for decades under less illustrious titles and authorships, e.g. Heywood &
Redhead (1983), Stairs (1983), Brown & Svetlichny (1990), and Clifton (1993).
3. Circularity, in that indeterminism is presupposed (namely in the assumption that
‘experimenters have a certain freedom’) instead of derived.
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One aim of this chapter is to clarify these matters, with the following conclusions:
1. The difference between earlier literature in the same direction and the FWT is
largely one of emphasis, namely on free will (!), exemplifying a recent trend
(also found elsewhere) in emphasizing free choice of the settings of experiments.
Unfortunately, like Bell, Conway and Kochen even mathematically use an infor-
mal way of talking about free settings, not to speak of the complete absence of
any serious philosophical analysis of free will among all three authors (for which
perhaps Bell, but certainly not Conway and Kochen may be excused).
2. Granting the informal characterization of free settings, both Bell’s (1964) The-
orem and the FWT establish a contradiction between quantum mechanics, deter-
minism, and locality (in the sense of Bell, which in the presence of determinism
reduces to a no-signaling condition called parameter independence).
3. The technical difference between Bell’s Theorem and the FWT lies in four facts:
a. Bell’s arguments rely on probability theory (whereas the FWT does not).
b. The (optical) corner of quantum mechanics used in Bell’s Theorem may be
replaced by the corresponding experimental results, whereas the FWT uses
uncontroversial yet untested predictions about massive spin-1 particles.
c. The FWT must assume perfect (EPR) correlations, which are difﬁcult to realize
and hence are avoided by later versions of Bell’s Theorem (i.e. through the
CHSH inequalities rather than the original Bell inequalities).
d. Like EPR, Bell and his followers focused on locality right from the begin-
ning, and hence in Bell (1964) the inference is from locality to determinism.
Conway and Kochen, on the other hand, resolve the contradiction their FWT
established by inferring randomness of outcomes from freedom of settings.
We start with a very simple treatment of both von Neumann’s argument against
linear hidden variables and Kochen & Specker’s reﬁnement of it, in which von Neu-
mann’s controversial linearity assumption is decisively weakened so as to only apply
to commuting operators; the Kochen–Specker Theorem excludes what are called
non-contextual quasi-linear hidden variables. We then present what we see as a
more transparent version of the FWT, whose key ingredient of replacing the non-
contextuality assumption in the Kochen–Specker Theorem by a locality condition
is preserved, but where this time the setting is completely deterministic. Freedom
of choice then arises as a very natural independence assumption, and any threat of
circularity is avoided: the conclusion is simply a contradiction between determin-
ism, freedom of choice (i.e. of apparatus settings), locality, and quantum mechanics.
Moreover, as we argue in §6.3, the philosophically precise concept of free will used
in the assumptions of the FWT is what Lewis coined ‘local miracle compatibilism’.
Following an interlude on the GHZ Theorem, which seamlessly ﬁts into the given
framework, we then turn to Bell’s Theorems, which we compare with the FWT.
Finally, we give our own rigorous version of an argument ﬁrst proposed by Col-
beck and Renner to the effect that, under suitable freeness of choice and no-signaling
conditions (similar to those in Bell’s Theorem and the FWT), as long as they are
compatible with quantum mechanics, hidden variables are at best irrelevant. In fact,
this can only be proved under much stronger assumptions, obscuring the claim.
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6.1 From von Neumann to Kochen–Specker
Von Neumann’s Theorem 6.2 below was the ﬁrst technical result excluding some
class of hidden variables underneath quantum mechanics, namely (in current par-
lance) linear non-contextual hidden variables. This terminology requires some ex-
planation. First, theorems of this kind apparently accept the mathematical structure
of the observables prescribed by the usual formalism of quantum theory, i.e., ob-
servables are identiﬁed with elements of the self-adjoint part
Hn(C)≡Mn(C)sa = {a ∈Mn(C) | a∗ = a} (6.1)
of the algebra Mn(C) of n×n matrices (this simple case sufﬁces to make all points
of conceptual interest). Short of introducing “hidden” observables, hidden variable
theories propose the existence of hidden states, which either replace or supplement
the usual quantum states (which in the case at hand would be density operators).
Mimicking classical (statistical) physics, such states are interpreted as probabil-
ity measures on some phase space X , whose points x ∈ X assign sharp values to
quantum-mechanical observables. Naively, this is done through associated functions
Vx : Hn(C)→ R, (6.2)
but in fact this choice already commits us to the ﬁrst of two possibilities, which we
pragmatically present as theories predicting measurement outcomes:
• In non-contextual deterministic theories of measurement, the outcome solely
depends on the observable a that is being measured and on the (possibly ‘hidden’)
state of the system. Theorem 6.2 below, then, rules out such theories in which
values are sharp (i.e., dispersion-free), and Vx in (6.2) is linear. The Kochen–
Specker Theorem subsequently proves the same impossibility under a weaker
(and physically more reasonable) assumption called quasi-linearity.
• Contextual deterministic theories of measurement, on the other hand, allow the
outcome of some measurement of a to depend on the measurement context (as
well as on the state), which in this case is understood as the choice of possible
other (compatible) observables b measured together with a (i.e., ab = ba). This
seems a reasonable assumption, well within the spirit of quantum mechanics,
though perhaps not so in the extreme form later held by Heisenberg, according
to which measurement outcomes (or even “reality”) are “created” by the mea-
surement. Under a weakened non-contextuality assumption, Bell’s Theorem (cf.
§6.5) and the Free Will Theorem (§6.2) rule out such theories, too.
Deﬁnition 6.1. A non-contextual hidden variable is a map V : Hn(C) → R that
for each a ∈ Hn(C), and in terms of the n×n unit matrix 1n, satisﬁes
V (a2) = V (a)2; (6.3)
V (1n) = 1. (6.4)
That is, V is dispersion-free as well as normalized, respectively.
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Theorem 6.2. For n ≥ 2, non-zero linear dispersion-free maps V : Hn(C)→ R do
not exist. In particular, linear non-contextual hidden variables do not exist.
Proof. Such maps extend to complex-linear dispersion-free maps V : Mn(C)→ C
by complex linearity, so that theorem is equivalent to Proposition 2.10. 
As von Neumann perfectly well understood himself, his seemingly natural linear-
ity assumption (given the mathematical structure of quantum mechanics unearthed
by none other than he!) is unwarranted physically (and even mathematically, since
eigenvalues and eigenstates, which should be the hallmark of dispersion-free states,
are by no means linear in the underlying operator). This suggests the following:
Deﬁnition 6.3. A map V : Hn(C)→ R is called quasi-linear if for all s, t ∈ R and
all a,b ∈ Hn(C) that commute (i.e., ab= ba) one has
V (sa+ tb) = sV (a)+ tV (b). (6.5)
As in the linear case, such a map uniquely extends to a map V : Mn(C)→ C that is
precisely a quasi-state in the sense of Deﬁnition 2.26. The following lemma will be
useful, also showing that the above objections to linearity have been met.
Lemma 6.4. Let V : Hn(C)→ R be a quasi-linear non-contextual hidden variable.
1. For each a ∈ Hn(C), the number λ =V (a) is an eigenvalue of a.
2. If (a1, . . . ,ak) pairwise commute, and b = f (a1, . . . ,ak) for some polynomial f ,
then V (b) = f (V (a1), . . . ,V (ak)).
More generally, it follows from Theorem C.24 that if H is a Hilbert space and V :
B(H)sa → R is a quasi-linear non-contextual hidden variable (or, equivalently, its
complexiﬁcation VC : B(H)→C is a dispersion-free quasi-state), then V (a) ∈ σ(a)
(provided a∗ = a). This implies the above lemma, but we also provide a direct proof.
Proof. For any b ∈ Hn(C) with ab= ba, eq. (6.3) and quasi-linearity imply that
V (ab) =V (a)V (b); (6.6)
just evaluate V ((a± b)2) = (V (a)±V (b))2. Taking b = a2 etc. and also invoking
(6.4) then yields V (p(a)) = p(V (a)) for any polynomial in a. If λi are the eigenval-
ues of a, its characteristic polynomial p(a) =∏ni=1(a−λi) satisﬁes p(a) = 0, so that
V (p(a)) = 0 and hence p(V (a)) = 0, or∏ni=1(λ −λi) = 0. This implies that λ = λi
for some i. The second claim is proved in a similar way. 
Theorem 6.5. For n≥ 3, quasi-linear non-contextual hidden variables do not exist.
This is the Kochen–Specker Theorem. It follows from Gleason’s Theorem 2.28 and
von Neumann’s Theorem 6.2, since according to Corollary 2.29 to the former, quasi-
states on Mn(C) are actually states (in other words, quasi-linear non-contextual hid-
den variables are linear). However, Kochen and Specker also gave a direct proof of
their theorem, subsequently somewhat simpliﬁed along the following lines.
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Proof. We prove the claim for n = 3, which (by restricting V to any self-adjoint
subalgebra of Mn(C) isomorphic to H3(C)) implies the result for all n > 3 also. To
prove Theorem 6.5 for n = 3, we interpret H3(C) as the algebra of observables of a
spin-1 particle and introduce the well-known angular momentum matrices
J1 =
⎛⎝ 0 0 00 0 −i
0 i 0
⎞⎠ , J2 =
⎛⎝ 0 0 i0 0 0
−i 0 0
⎞⎠ , J3 =
⎛⎝0 −i 0i 0 0
0 0 0
⎞⎠ . (6.7)
In what follows, we will heavily use the squares
J21 =
⎛⎝ 0 0 00 1 0
0 0 1
⎞⎠ , J22 =
⎛⎝ 1 0 00 0 0
0 0 1
⎞⎠ , J23 =
⎛⎝1 0 00 1 0
0 0 0
⎞⎠ , (6.8)
each of which has eigenvalues 0 and 1. The J2i commute by inspection, and satisfy
J21 + J
2
2 + J
2
3 = 2 ·13. (6.9)
The (matrix-valued) angular momentum vector is given by
J= J1e1+ J2e2+ J3e3, (6.10)
where (e1,e2,e3) is the standard basis of R3 (seen as a vector space with the usual
inner product 〈·, ·〉), i.e., e1 = (1,0,0), etc., and the angular momentum Ju along an
arbitrary unit vector u= ∑i uiei in R3 is given by
Ju = 〈J,u〉=
3
∑
i=1
Jiui. (6.11)
This brings us to the crucial point: a map V : H3(C)→R induces a map V˜ : S2 →R
on the set S2 of all unit vectors u in R3, via
V˜ (u) =V (J2u). (6.12)
As usual, a basis ofR3, denoted by a= (u1,u2,u3), is always assumed orthonormal.
Lemma 6.6. Let V : H3(C)→ R be a non-contextual quasi-linear hidden variable,
with associated map V˜ : S2 →{0,1} given by (6.12). Then:
1. V˜ (−u) = V˜ (u) for each u∈ S2 (so that V˜ is deﬁned on the real projective plane);
2. If a = (u1,u2,u3) is a basis, then the triple V˜ (a) ≡ (V˜ (u1),V˜ (u2),V˜ (u3)) must
contain a single 0 and two 1’s, i.e., V˜ (a) must be one of the triples
λ (1) = (0,1,1);
λ (2) = (1,0,1);
λ (3) = (1,1,0). (6.13)
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In Gleason-like language, V˜ is a 2-valued frame function of weight w(V˜ ) = 2.
Proof. If a = (u1,u2,u3) is a basis, then Jui = uJiu∗ for i = 1,2,3, where u is the
3×3 matrix with entries ui j = 〈ui,e j〉. Since u is unitary, the matrices Jui and their
squares have the same eigenvalues and satisfy the same relations as the Ji and their
squares. Thus the eigenvalues of J2ui are 0 and 1, for ﬁxed a the squares J
2
ui mutually
commute, and they satisfy the sum rule (6.9), i.e., J2u1 +J
2
u2 +J
2
u3 = 2 ·13, so V˜ (u1)+
V˜ (u2)+V˜ (u3) = 2. The claim then follows from Deﬁnition 6.3 and Lemma 6.4. 
Now deﬁne a coloring ofR3 as any map V˜ : S2 →{0,1} satisfying the two properties
in Lemma (6.6). The proof of Theorem 6.5 then reduces to the following lemma.
Lemma 6.7. There exists no coloring of R3.
Proof. Take the following unit vectors (some identical), grouped into 11 bases (for
simplicity we use unnormalized vectors, e.g., (1,0,1) stands for (1/
√
2,0,1/
√
2)):
basis u1 u2 u3
a1 (0,0,1) (1,0,0) (0,1,0)
a2 (1,0,1) (−1,0,1) (0,1,0)
a3 (0,1,1) (0,−1,1) (1,0,0)
a4 (1,−1,2) (−1,1,2) (1,1,0)
a5 (1,0,2) (−2,0,1) (0,1,0)
a6 (2,1,1) (0,−1,1) (−2,1,1)
a7 (2,0,1) (0,1,0) (−1,0,2)
a8 (1,1,2) (1,−1,0) (−1,−1,2)
a9 (0,1,2) (1,0,0) (0,−2,1)
a10 (1,2,1) (−1,0,1) (1,−2,1)
a11 (1,0,0) (0,2,1) (0,−1,2).
We will show that one cannot even color this particular ﬁnite set of vectors (let alone
all unit vectors in R3). We denote a vector ui in a basis aμ by
u(μ)i , i= 1,2,3 ,μ = 1, . . . ,11,
and write e.g. V˜ (aμ) = (0,1,1) for the three conditions
V˜ (u(μ)1 ) = 0, V˜ (u
(μ)
2 ) = 1), V˜ (u
(μ)
3 ) = 1.
The main point is that if some coloring V˜ maps a speciﬁc vector u to 0, then all
vectors orthogonal to u must go to 1. In particular, two orthogonal vectors can never
both be sent to 0. To ﬁnd a contradiction (to the assumption that V˜ exists), we try
to assign values V˜ (u(μ)i ) one after the other, starting in row 1. Here some speciﬁc
choices will be made, but by symmetry other choices lead to similar contradictions.
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1. Suppose that V˜ (a1) = (0,1,1) (i.e., V˜ (u
(1)
1 ) = 0 and V˜ (u
(1)
2 ) = V˜ (u
(1)
3 ) = 1). In
a2 this forces V˜ (u
(2)
3 ) = 1, so that either u
(2)
1 or u
(2)
2 must be mapped to 0 (and
the other to 1). Let V˜ (u(2)1 ) = 0, so that V˜ (u
(2)
2 ) = 1, i.e., V˜ (u2) = (0,1,1). In a3
one has u(3)3 = u
(1)
2 , so V˜ (u
(3)
3 ) = 1. We choose V˜ (u
(3)
1 ) = 0 and hence V˜ (u
(3)
2 ) =
1, so V˜ (u2) = (0,1,1). In a4, the vector u
(4)
3 is orthogonal to u
(1)
1 , which has
been mapped to zero already, so that V˜ (u(4)3 ) = 1. The remaining free choice is
arbitrarily made as V˜ (u(4)1 ) = 0, so that V˜ (u
(4)
2 ) = 1 and hence V˜ (a4) = (0,1,1).
2. But now everything is ﬁxed for a5 t/m a11, as follows. From a5, the vector u
(5)
3
already occurred in u1, and moreover, u
(5)
2 is orthogonal to u
(4)
1 from a4. Be-
cause V˜ (u(4)1 ) = 0, one must have V˜ (u
(4)
2 ) = 1. And so on and so forth, yielding
V˜ (aμ) = (0,1,1) voor μ = 5, . . . ,10 (as was the case also for μ = 1,2,3,4).
3. In a11 one has u
(11)
1 = u
(1)
2 , so u
(11)
1 is mapped to 1. Furthermore, u
(11)
2 is or-
thogonal to u(4)1 , which was mapped to 0; hence u
(11)
2 goes to 1. Finally, u
(11)
3 is
orthogonal to u(10)1 , which was mapped to 0, so that u
(11) must go to 1. Thus
V˜ (a11) = (1,1,1). (6.14)
But (1,1,1) is not an admissible value of V˜ ! So V˜ and hence V cannot exist. 
Corollary 6.8. There is no function V˜ with the two properties stated in Lemma 6.6.
The Kochen–Specker Theorem is often stated in the following way.
Deﬁnition 6.9. For any ﬁnite-dimensional Hilbert space H, a coloring of the set
P1(H) of one-dimensional projections on H is a function
W :P1(H)→{0,1}
such that for any resolution of the identity (ei) with ei ∈P1(H), i.e.,
eie j = δi jei; (6.15)
∑
i
ei = 1H , (6.16)
one has
∑
i
W (ei) = 1, (6.17)
so that there is exactly one member ei of the family such that W (ei) = 1.
Note that if e ∈P1(H) then e = eψ = |ψ〉〈ψ| for some unit vector ψ ∈ H, so
that each basis (υi) of H deﬁnes such a family by ei = |υi〉〈υi|, and vice versa,
up to phase factors. The setting of Gleason’s Theorem is similar, with the crucial
difference that the function onP1(H) in question then takes values in [0,1] instead
of {0,1} and hence can be shown to exist, even amply so (as there are many states).
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Theorem 6.10. If dim(H)> 2, there exists no coloring ofP1(H).
Proof. For H = C3, the existence of W would yield the existence of V˜ through
V˜ (u) = 1−W (eu), (6.18)
where u ∈ R3 is regarded as a vector in C3. Property 1 in Lemma 6.6 is obviously
satisﬁed. To prove property 2, we note that for any unit vector u∈R3 ⊂C3, we have
J2uu= 0, (6.19)
since an explicit computation based on (6.11) shows that, with u= (u1,u2,u3),
J2u =
⎛⎝ u22+u23 −u1u2 −u1u3−u1u2 u21+u23 −u2u3
−u1u3 −u2u3 u21+u22
⎞⎠ . (6.20)
It follows from rotation invariance that the eigenvalues of J2u are the same as those
of each J2i , cf. (6.8), i.e., λ = 0 with multiplicity one and λ = 1 with multiplicity
two. Hence (6.19) gives the projection e0 onto the eigenspace of J2u for λ = 0 as
e0 = |u〉〈u| ≡ eu. (6.21)
Property 2 in Lemma 6.6 then follows from the assumption that W is a coloring.
Since V˜ cannot exist by Lemma 6.7, neither can W . This proves the claim for C3.
We ﬁnish by induction. Suppose Cn contains some set {uk}k∈K of unit vectors
that cannot be colored, assuming that u0 = (1,0, . . . ,0) lies in this set. We embed
each uk into Cn+1 by adding a zero at the end, calling the image u′k. Adding v =
(0, . . . ,0,1), the only possible coloring of the set {u′k,v}k∈K in Cn+1 is given by
W (u′k) = 0 for each k ∈ K and W (v) = 1. Indeed, if W (u′k0) = 1 for some k0, then,
since v is orthogonal to each u′k, we must have W (v) = 0, which means that the
original set {uk}k∈K should be colorable inCn, but this is impossible by assumption.
We now embed each uk into Cn+1 by adding a zero at the beginning, denoting its
image by u′′k , and add u
′
0 = (1,0, . . . ,0,0). By the same token, the only coloring of
the set {u′′k ,u′0}k∈K is given by W (u′′k ) = 0 for each k ∈ K and W (u′0) = 1. But this
leaves the set {u′k,u′′k ,v}k∈K in Cn+1 uncolorable, since colorability of {u′k,v}k∈K
gave W (u′0) = 0, whereas colorability of {u′′k ,u′0}k∈K gave W (u′0) = 1. 
The set thus obtained is larger than necessary. For example, already for H = C4 the
following bases cannot be colored (again writing down unnormalized vectors):
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basis u1 u2 u3 u4
a1 (0,0,0,1) (0,0,1,0) (1,1,0,0) (1,−1,0,0)
a2 (0,0,0,1) (0,1,0,0) (1,0,1,0) (1,0,−1,0)
a3 (1,−1,1,−1) (1,−1,−1,1) (1,1,0,0) (0,0,1,1)
a4 (1,−1,1,−1) (1,1,1,1) (1,0,−1,0) (0,1,0,−1)
a5 (0,0,1,0) (0,1,0,0) (1,0,0,1) (1,0,0,−1)
a6 (1,−1,−1,1) (1,1,1,1) (1,0,0,−1) (0,1,−1,0)
a7 (1,1,−1,1) (1,1,1,−1) (1,−1,0,0) (0,0,1,1)
a8 (1,1,−1,1) (−1,1,1,1) (1,0,1,0) (0,1,0,−1)
a9 (1,1,1,−1) (−1,1,1,1) (1,0,0,1) (0,1,−1,0)
The proof is the following observation: if we present the coloring condition as
W (0,0,0,1)+W (0,0,1,0)+W (1,1,0,0)+W (1,−1,0,0) = 1; (a1)
· · · (a•)
W (1,1,1,−1)+W (−1,1,1,1)+W (1,0,0,1)+W (0,1,−1,0) = 1, (a9)
then since there are nine such equations the sum of the right-hand sides is odd,
whereas the sum of the left-hand sides is even, since each vector appears twice.
To bridge the gap between the Kochen–Specker Theorem and the Free Will The-
orem, as well as the one between mathematics and physics, we now rephrase the
former as a “mini FWT”. We build an experiment consisting of a box containing a
spin-1 particle and a device capable of measuring all of the three observables
(J2u1 ,J
2
u2 ,J
2
u3)
for an arbitrary basis a of R3; since the operators in question commute, this si-
multaneous measurement is allowed by quantum theory. The choice of a is called
the setting of the experiment, traditionally denoted by A (in honor of Alice, who is
supposed to perform the experiment), with possible values A = a. In “phenomeno-
logical” notation, the observable measured in an experiment like this is called F ,
which in the case at hand has three components F = (F1,F2,F3): given the setting a,
the observable Fi corresponds to J2ui . The notation F = λ for λ = (λ1,λ2,λ3), i.e.,
Fi = λi, then expresses the fact that the outcome of a measurement of F is λ .
According to both quantum mechanics and our quasi-linear non-contextual hid-
den variable theory, either λi = 0 or λi = 1, and λ must lie in the value space
Λ = {(0,1,1),(1,0,1),(1,1,0)}; (6.22)
cf. Lemma 6.6 for the hidden variable theory, while in quantum mechanics (6.22)
follows from the fact that λ must lie in the joint spectrum of the three operators J2ui .
200 6 Classical models of quantum mechanics
This, in turn means that there must be a joint eigenvector ψ such that J2ui = λiψ
for each i = 1,2,3. There are three such joint eigenvectors, namely u1, u2, and
u3 (initially deﬁned as vectors in R3 but now seen as vectors in C3), with joint
eigenvalues (0,1,1), (1,0,1), and (1,1,0), respectively.
Otherwise, quantum mechanics and our quasi-linear non-contextual hidden vari-
able theory provide a different picture of the experiment. According to the former
theory, a given spin-1 particle may be prepared in a (pure) quantum state ψ , which
is a unit vector in C3. Quantum theory then merely predicts probabilities
Pψ(F = λ |A= a)≡ pJ2u1 ,J2u2 ,J2u3 (λ1,λ2,λ3), (6.23)
for the possible outcomes λ , which according to the Born rule (2.21) are given by
Pψ(F = λ (i)|A= a) = |〈ui,ψ〉|2. (6.24)
So if ψ = ui, then the outcome will be λ = λ (i) with probability one, but in a super-
position ψ =∑i ciui (with ∑i |ci|2 = 1), quantum theory predicts a random sequence
of outcomes λ (i), each with probability |ci|2.
Let us note that quantum mechanics is non-contextual in the following (proba-
bilistic) sense. Alice could decide to perform just one measurement instead of three,
say F1, with setting a1 = u1, or perhaps she may not know if the other two are
performed. Fortunately, this does not matter, since for any unit vector ψ ∈ C3,
Pψ(F1 = λ1|A1 = u1) = ∑
λ2,λ3
Pψ(F = λ |A= a), (6.25)
so that according to quantum mechanics, it does not matter for the Born probabilities
of the ﬁrst measurement if the other two are performed or not.
The question now arises if some quasi-linear non-contextual hidden variable the-
ory theory could improve on this, in that the probabilities quantum theory assigns
to various outcomes are replaced by predictions. In the sprit of determinism (whilst
avoiding the appearance of circularity), such a theory should also predict the settings
of the experiment. Accordingly, the assumptions leading to our “mini FWT” are:
Deﬁnition 6.11. In the context of the experiment on spin-1 particles just discussed:
• Determinism ﬁrstly means that there is a state space X with associated functions
A : X → XA; (6.26)
F : X →Λ , (6.27)
where XA is the set of all bases in R3 (i.e. a ∈ XA), and Λ is some set of possible
outcomes; these functions completely describe the experiment in the sense that
each state x ∈ X determines both its settings a= A(x) and its outcome λ = F(x).
Here A= (A1,A2,A3), where the functions Ai : X → S2 (seen as the space of unit
vectors in R3) combine to deﬁne a basis, and F = (F1,F2,F3), where Fi : X →R.
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Secondly, there exists some set XZ and an additional function
Z : X → XZ , (6.28)
such that
F = F(A,Z). (6.29)
More precisely, for each x ∈ X one has
F(x) = Fˆ(A(x),Z(x)) (6.30)
for a certain function Fˆ : XA×XZ → Λ . Also this function is, of course, a triple
Fˆ = (Fˆ1, Fˆ2, Fˆ3), where Fˆi : XA×XZ → 2. In terms of (6.28), then:
• Nature then requires that Λ is given by (6.22) (so that Fi : X → 2).
• Freedom states that A and Z are independent in the sense that the function
A×Z : X → XA×XZ
x → (A(x),Z(x)) (6.31)
is surjective; in other words, for each (a,z)∈ XA×XZ there is an x∈ X for which
A(x) = a and Z(x) = z (making a and z free variables).
• Non-contextuality (cf. Lemma 6.6) ﬁnally stipulates that Fˆ take the form
Fˆ((u1,u2,u3),z) = (F˜(u1,z), F˜(u2,z), F˜(u3,z)), (6.32)
for a single function F˜ : S2×XZ → 2 that also satisﬁes
F˜(−u,z) = F˜(u,z). (6.33)
“Nature” may be taken to be either an experimental result or an uncontroversial
prediction of (some corner of) quantum mechanics. The function Z (including its
domain XZ) describes anything relevant to the experiment (such as the behaviour of
the particle) except the variables determining the settings (which do form part of
X). The goal of the freedom assumption is to remove any potential dependencies
between the variables (a,z), and hence between the physical system Alice perform
her measurements on, and the devices she performs her measurements with.
Corollary 6.12. Determinism, Nature, Freedom, and Non-contextuality are contra-
dictory.
Proof. For each z ∈ XZ , deﬁne a function V˜z : S2 → 2 by V˜z(u) = F˜(u,z). The as-
sumptions combine to give V˜z the same properties as V˜ in Lemma 6.6 (where z
“goes along for a free ride”). According to Corollary 6.8 (which applies because by
Freedom one can freely vary a for any given z), the function V˜z cannot exist. 
This “mini FWT” is a good exercise for the Free Will Theorem in the next section.
For example, let us note, as a warning, that if Determinism is seen as the culprit (and
hence falls), then the other assumptions in the (min) FWT are no longer deﬁned. This
blocks a direct inference from Freedom to Indeterminism a` la Conway & Kochen.
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6.2 The Free Will Theorem
The Free Will Theorem is similar in spirit to Corollary 6.12, with the difference that
the experiment now has two wings and the non-contextuality assumption is replaced
by a certain locality condition. This condition relates to the setting introduced by
Einstein, Podolsky, and Rosen in 1935 and further studied by Bohm, Bell, and oth-
ers, in which (in current jargon) two physicists, called Alice and Bob, are far apart
whilst performing simultaneous experiments on some correlated two-particle state
(technically speaking, their measurements need to be spacelike separated). In the
situation considered by EPR each particle had a spatial degree of freedom and hence
required the inﬁnite-dimensional Hilbert space L2(R3) for its description, but, as
recognized by Bohm, the thrust of the argument comes out more clearly if each
particle merely has an internal degree of freedom (and is “frozen” otherwise).
Bell (1964) considered a pair of spin 12 particles (cf. §6.5), each of which has
Hilbert spaceC2 (although the famous experiments of Aspect testing the violation of
Bell’s inequalities used photons, which have the “same” Hilbert space), but because
of its reliance on the Kochen–Specker Theorem (which fails for C2) the Free Will
Theorem requires one dimension more, i.e., H = C3. As before, we see this as the
state space of a massive spin-1 particle. The price of this extra dimension is that
the pertinent experiment whose outcome provides the Nature input for the Free Will
Theorem has not actually been performed, but, as in the Bell case, the predictions
of quantum mechanics are uncontroversial and will serve as input instead.
These predictions are as follows. Alice and Bob measure on the correlated state
ψ0 = (e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2+ e3⊗ e3)/
√
3, (6.34)
where we recall that (e1,e2,e3) is the standard basis of R3, now seen as a basis of
C3. This state is rotation-invariant, which means that nonzero angular momentum in
one particle must be compensated for in the other, creating the desired correlations.
As before, we denote Alice’s setting by A= a, which remains the choice of some
basis of R3, but this time also Bob picks some basis b, so that we write B= b for his
choice. Similar to Alice’s outcome F = λ we denote Bob’s by G = γ , and quantum
mechanics provides all (Born) probabilities
Pψ0(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b)≡ pJ2u1 ,J2u2 ,J2u3 ,J2v1 ,J2v2 ,J2v3 (λ1,λ2,λ3,γ1,γ2,γ3),
which are well deﬁned because Alice’s squared angular momentum operators J2u1
commute with Bob’s J2v1 as a consequence of Einstein locality (stating that spacelike
separated observables commute). Note that similarly to a = (u1,u2,u3) for Alice’s
basis, we write b = (v1,v2,v3) for Bob’s. If Alice merely measures Fi whilst Bob
measures Gj, then, as in the previous section, it does not matter which other (com-
muting) operators are measured and/or whether Alice and Bob know about this, cf.
(6.25). Thus we may write either (A = a,B = b) or Ai = ui,Bi = vi for the settings,
and simple calculations show that the Born probabilities are given by:
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Pψ0(Fi = 1,Gj = 1|A= a,B= b) = 13 (1+ 〈ui,v j〉2); (6.35)
Pψ0(Fi = 0,Gj = 0|A= a,B= b) = 13 〈ui,v j〉2; (6.36)
Pψ0(Fi = 1,Gj = 0|A= a,B= b) = 13 (1−〈ui,v j〉2); (6.37)
Pψ0(Fi = 0,Gj = 1|A= a,B= b) = 13 (1−〈ui,v j〉2), (6.38)
where 〈ui,v j〉2 = |〈ui,v j〉|2, etc., since the vectors are real, In terms of the notation
Pψ0(Fi = Gj| ·) = Pψ0(Fi = 0,Gj = 0| ·)+Pψ0(Fi = 1,Gj = 1| ·); (6.39)
Pψ0(Fi = Gj| ·) = Pψ0(Fi = 0,Gj = 1| ·)+Pψ0(Fi = 1,Gj = 0| ·), (6.40)
this yields
Pψ0(Fi = Gj|A= a,B= b) = 13 (1+2〈ui,v j〉2); (6.41)
Pψ0(Fi = Gj|A= a,B= b) = 23 (1−〈ui,v j〉2). (6.42)
The crucial point for the Free Will Theorem is that this implies perfect correlation:
Pψ0(Fi = Gj|Ai = Bj) = 1, (6.43)
in agreement with the intuition about angular momentum expressed earlier.
We now move to a (possibly counterfactual) deterministic description of this ex-
periment along the lines of the previous section. It is straightforward to adapt all
of Deﬁnition 6.11 except Non-contextuality (which after all is the assumption we
would like to get rid of!). With the obvious changes, we obtain:
• Determinism again ﬁrst claims there is a state space X with associated functions
A : X → XA; (6.44)
B : X → XB; (6.45)
F : X →Λ ; (6.46)
G : X →Λ , (6.47)
where XA = XB is the set of all bases in R3, and Λ is some set of possible
outcomes, which completely describe the experiment in the sense that each
state x ∈ X determines both its settings (a = A(x),b = B(x)) and its outcome
(λ =F(x),γ =G(x)). Here A= (A1,A2,A3) and B= (B1,B2,B3)where the func-
tions Ai : X → S2 (where S2 is seen as the space of unit vectors in R3) combine
to deﬁne a basis (similarly for Bj : X → S2), and F = (F1,F2,F3). Secondly, there
exists some set XZ and an additional function Z : X → XZ such that
F = F(A,B,Z); (6.48)
G = G(A,B,Z), (6.49)
in that for each x ∈ X one has the functional relationships
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F(x) = Fˆ(A(x),B(x),Z(x)); (6.50)
G(x) = Gˆ(A(x),B(x),Z(x)), (6.51)
for certain functions Fˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → Λ and Gˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → Λ , each
of which is a triple Fˆ = (Fˆ1, Fˆ2, Fˆ3) with Fˆi : XA×XB×XZ → R, etc. The value
z= Z(x) is just the traditional “hidden variable” (which is often denoted by λ ).
• Freedom then states that A, B, and Z are independent in that for each (a,b,z) ∈
XA×XB×XZ there is an x ∈ X for which A(x) = a, B(x) = b, and Z(x) = z.
• Nature requires that:
– Λ is given by (6.22), i.e. Fi and Gj, and hence Fˆi and Gˆ j take values in {0,1};
– The experiment measures squares of angular momenta, so that
Fˆ(a′,b′,z) = Fˆ(a,b,z); (6.52)
Gˆ(a′,b′,z) = Gˆ(a,b,z), (6.53)
whenever (a′,b′) differ from (a,b) by changing the sign of any basis vector;
– Perfect correlation obtains, cf. (6.43), i.e., writing a= (u1,u2,u3) for Alice’s
basis and b= (v1,v2,v3) for Bob’s, one has
ui = v j ⇒ Fˆi(a,b,z) = Gˆ j(a,b,z). (6.54)
We now come to the locality condition that is to replace Non-contextuality. This
condition was ﬁrst clearly stated by Bell (1964, p. 196), who attributes it to Einstein:
‘The vital assumption is that the result G for particle 2 does not depend on the setting a of
the magnet for particle 1, nor F on b.’
Noting various other notions of locality (such as Einstein locality in local quantum
physics, which requires spacelike separated operators to commute, or Bell locality,
discussed below), the above idea might be called Context locality, but we will simply
refer to it as Locality. In our deterministic setting, a precise formulation is this:
• Locality means that F(A,B,Z) is independent of B and G(A,B,Z) is independent
of A. In other words, we have F = F(A,Z) and G = G(B,Z), so that (with slight
abuse of notation) Fˆ : XA×XZ →Λ and Gˆ : XB×XZ →Λ , or, then again, F(x) =
Fˆ(A(x),Z(x)) and G(x) = Gˆ(B(x),Z(x)), for each x ∈ X .
This ﬁnally brings us to (our reformulation of) the Free Will Theorem:
Theorem 6.13. Determinism, Freedom, Nature, and Locality are contradictory.
Proof. The Freedom assumption allows us to treat (a,b,z) as free variables, a
fact that will tacitly be used all the time. First, taking i = j in (6.54) shows that
Fˆi(u1,u2,u3,z) only depends on (ui,z), whilst Gˆ j(v1,v2,v3,z) only depends on
(v j,z). Hence we write Fˆi(a,z) = F˜i(ui,z), etc. Next, taking i = j in (6.54) shows
that F˜1(u,z) = F˜2(u,z) = F˜3(u,z). Consequently, the function Fˆ : XA×XZ → XF is
given by (6.32). We are now back to the proof of Corollary 6.12, concluding that
such a function does not exist by Corollary 6.8. 
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6.3 Philosophical intermezzo: Free will in the Free Will Theorem
‘The determinism-free will controversy has all of the earmarks of a dead problem. The
positions are well staked out and the opponents manning them stare at each other in mutual
incomprehension.’ (Earman, 1986, p. 235)
The question arises which speciﬁc notion of free will is among the assumptions of
the FWT (in the reformulation just given). To put this question in perspective, let
us brieﬂy recall the main point of the debate about free will. This concept has two
poles. One is the “will” itself, requiring a sense of agency, deliberation, and control.
This pole seems to require some form of determinism. A powerful expressions is:
‘Fu¨rst! Was Sie sind, sind Sie durch Zufall und Geburt. Was ich bin, bin ich durch mich.’1
(Beethoven, to his benefactor (!) Prince Lichnowsky)
The other pole of free will is the adjective “free”, i.e., the ability to do otherwise,
which at ﬁrst sight requires indeterminism. The problem of free will is that these
poles seem contradictory. Many authors conﬂate free will with moral responsibility:
‘free will can be deﬁned as the unique ability of persons to exercise control over their
conduct in the manner necessary for moral responsibility.’ (McKenna & Coates, 2015)
This aspect is irrelevant to our discussion, concerned as it is with the question what
it would mean for Alice and Bob to choose their settings “freely” if determinism is
assumed (it would have been different if one setting launched a nuclear missile).
Even in our narrow context, the traditional philosophical stances are relevant:
• Compatibilism denies the contradiction, claiming that free will and determinism
coexist. This position may be defended in many ways, among which one ﬁnds:
– Reconceptualizing “the ability to do otherwise” in a deterministic world. This
will be our focus in what follows, especially in a version inspired by Lewis.
– Belittling the relevance of “the ability to do otherwise”, as e.g. by Dennett:
‘So if anyone at all is interested in the question of whether one could have done
otherwise in exactly the same circumstances (and internal state) this will have to be
a particularly pure metaphysical curiosity—that is to say, a curiosity so pure as to be
utterly lacking in any ulterior motive, since the answer could not conceivably make
any noticeable difference to the way the world went.’ (Dennett, 1984, p. 559).
• Incompatibilism accepts the contradiction, once again branching off into:
– Libertarianism, arguing that free will requires an indeterministic world.
– Hard determinism, claiming determinism (which is assumed) blocks free will:
‘Ein Mensch kann zwar tun was er will, aber nicht wollen was er will.’2
(Schopenhauer)
– Hard incompatibilism, asserting that ‘every way you look at it you lose’:
free will makes no sense in either a deterministic or an indeterministic world.
1 ‘Lord! What you are, you are through chance and birth. What I am, I am because of myself.’
2 ‘One can admittedly do what one wants, but one cannot want what one wants.’
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Although hard incompatibilism has our sympathy, our opening question con-
cerning the notion of free will in the FWT drives us into the compatibilist direction,
since determinism is among the assumptions shown to be contradictory by Theo-
rem 6.13. Within compatibilism, we will be close to the well-known ‘local miracle’
variant thereof proposed by the philosopher David Lewis. Like other compatibilists
before him (starting at least with G.E. Moore), Lewis attempts to make sense of the
intuition that even in a deterministic world one in principle has the ability to act
differently from the way one actually does, despite the fact that the latter was pre-
determined. A simple example is Alice’s choosing setting a by moving her hand in
a certain way, although she was able to choose a′. On the other hand, she could not
have moved her hand with a speed greater than that of light, so her ability remains
constrained by the laws of nature. Lewis asks us to distinguish between:
• ‘I am able to do something such that, if I did it, a law would be broken.’
• ‘I am able to break a law.’
The latter is impossible, but the former is not on Lewis’s own theory of counterfac-
tuals, according to which the phrase ‘if I did it’ leads us to consider the possible
world in which doing ‘something’ is actually true, whilst in the possible worlds
under consideration as many other features as possible are kept the same as in the
actual world (the precise underlying measure of similarity is not important here).
Thus the phrase ‘a law would be broken’ refers to the laws of the actual world (in
which the alternative action is not realized). It seems to be of great importance to
Lewis that in the ﬁrst case it is not the agent who would break a law; instead, it is the
breaking of some law of our actual world at an earlier time that enables the subject
to do in an alternative possible world what she could not do in our actual world, .
By making this distinction, Lewis claims that he invalidates the seemingly lethal
Consequence Argument against compatibilist free will, of which a simple version
reads (assuming determinism, on which compatibilist free will is predicated):
1. Alice’s actions are a necessary consequence of the laws of nature plus the state
of the universe (or the relevant part thereof) at any earlier time;
2. Alice is unable to render both (laws and earlier states) false;
3. Alice is unable to render the consequences of laws and earlier states false;
4. Ergo: Alice is unable to do otherwise than what she actually does.
Lewis claims that statement 3 is ambiguous, in that it fails to distinguish between the
two senses in his two bullet points above. The Consequence Argument requires the
latter (which is false), whereas this argument itself is unsound on the former (which
is true). This disambiguation of assumption 3 in the Consequence Argument, then,
is supposed to save (compatibilist) free will. However, a considerable philosophical
literature suggests that the tension between Lewis’s denying the second bullet point
whilst accepting the ﬁrst is pretty uncomfortable, reﬂecting the corresponding ten-
sion between the conjunction of determinism and freedom in general; indeed, this is
what the FWT makes precise! Let us ﬁrst point out that, at least in his terminology
Lewis fails to make a clear distinction between laws of nature and initial states;
from the point of view of modern physics, this distinction is absolutely fundamental
(although it may dispappear in post-modern physics based in e.g. quantum gravity).
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Lewis’s examples of law-breaking events in our actual world typically refer to
violations of some law of nature (like exceeding the speed of light), whereas the (al-
leged) law-breaking in his counterfactuals, such as choosing a′ (where in fact Alice
did not do so) amounts to a change in some earlier state. Thus it might have been
more appropriate if the paper in which Lewis laid out his version of compatibalism
had been entitled Are we free to change the states? instead of Are we free to break
the laws?. On this revision, his distinction of the two cases takes the following form:
• I am able to do something such that, if I did it, the state of the actual world at
some earlier time would have been different.
• I am able to change the actual state of the world.
The latter remains impossible, while it is the former that enables free will. Applied
to Alice, the former should mean (still in the compatibilist spirit of Lewis):
• A slight alteration in the state of the actual world (which would have made it a
different but very similar world according to Lewis) would have led Alice to do
something (such as choosing a′) that she did not do in the actual world (because
according to determinism its actual state at any earlier time—as opposed to the
counterfactual alternative state in the discussion—led her to choose a).
We now make this revised version of Lewis’s local miracle compatibilism math-
ematically precise, in a way that has the additional advantage of involving not only
“the ability do do otherwise”, but also the other component free will, i.e. agency.
Here the intuition is that free will involves a separation between the agent, Alice,
(who is to exercise it) and the rest of the world, under whose inﬂuence she acts.
Namely, as in the FWT, let X be the state space of the Universe, and let
a= A(x) (6.55)
again be Alice’s setting, where A : X → XA, as before. We now assume that a is
determined by her “inner state” I as well as the “outer state” O of the rest of the
world, under whose inﬂuence she acts. These, in turn, are determined by the state
x ∈ X of the world. That is, A= A(O, I), which expresses the existence of functions
O : X → XO; (6.56)
I : X → XI ; (6.57)
Aˆ : XO×XI → XA, (6.58)
where XO and XI are certain sets, such that for each x ∈ X one has
A(x) = Aˆ(O(x), I(x)). (6.59)
In other words, for some given state x of the world we have
o = O(x); (6.60)
i = I(x); (6.61)
a = Aˆ(o, i). (6.62)
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Note that, in the spirit of Conway and Kochen, in the above analysis Alice (whose
free choice they after all believe to be ultimately a consequence of the free choice
of elementary particles) now plays the role of the spin-1 particles in the bipartite
experiment. Thus the analogy is between the triples:
(a,z,λ ) ∈ XA×Z×Λ ; (6.63)
(o, i,a) ∈ XO×XI ×XA. (6.64)
• The ﬁrst triple is deﬁned in the experimental context of the FWT, where a is the
setting of Alice’s wing of the experiment (which from the perspective of the spin-
1 particle plays the role of the outer state of the world), z is the inner state of the
particle, and λ is the outcome of Alice’s measurement.
• The second pertains to the analysis of Alice’s “free” choice of the setting of her
experiment, where o is the outer state of the world, i is her inner state, and a is
her actual setting, given x ∈ X and hence (o, i) = (O(x), I(x)).
Beyond Determinism, which is expressed by the above framework, our funda-
mental assumption underpinning compatibilist free will is Freedom, deﬁned exactly
as in the FWT: O and I are independent in that the following function is surjective:
O× I : X → XO×XI
x → (O(x), I(x)), (6.65)
i.e., for each pair (o, i) ∈ XI ×XO there is x ∈ X for which (6.60) and (6.61) hold.
Rephrasing our earlier analysis in this elementary mathematical language, Lewis
wants to make sense of the idea that although Alice’s choice (6.62) at some ﬁxed
time t was determined by the state x of the Universe at that time through (6.60) -
(6.61), or, equivalently, through (6.59), and hence—and this is the whole point of the
Consequence Argument Lewis challenges—by any earlier state xp of the Universe
at time tp, nonetheless Alice was “able to act otherwise” at time t, e.g. in choosing
a′ = Aˆ(o′, i′), (6.66)
but did not do so, since choosing a′ would illegally have changed the state x to x′
(both at time t), and, equivalently (given determinism), would have changed xp to
x′p. On our reading of Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals, Alice’s ability to choose a′
simply means that there exists a state x′ of the world close to x in the sense that
O(x′) = O(x) = o, (6.67)
making the environment in which Alice acts the same as in the actual world, but
i′ = I(x′) = I(x) = i, (6.68)
where i′ should be close to i in some appropriate sense (such as a slight change in
the state of Alice’s brain), such that (6.66) holds, with o′ = o as required by (6.67).
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The point, then, is that according to our Freedom assumption, there indeed is such
a nearby state x′, for any given i′ and (o, i). Thus the freedom Alice has is precisely
what we have formalized as Freedom: even given the state o of the causal inﬂuences
on her behaviour (and possibly even the entire state of the rest of the world), there is
a different admissible state x′ of the world such that, had this state been actual, she
would have chosen a′ (although she in fact, necessarily, picked a).
It should be clear now that at least in the context of the Free Will Theorem, our
precise technical formulation of all assumptions implies that the freedom Alice and
Bob have in choosing their settings is an instance of the local miracle compatibilist
form of free will proposed by Lewis (1981), at least if one accepts our reformulation
thereof. The theorem then establishes a contradiction between:
• the physics assumptions, i.e., Nature, and Locality;
• the compatibilist free will assumption, i.e., Determinism and Freedom.
Accepting the former, the latter must fall. Making this choice, one should realize that
the physics assumptions on the one hand just form a small corner of modern physics
(from which point of view they are weak), but on the other hand have singled out
the corner in which the two fundamental theories of quantum mechanics and special
relativity meet and are brought to a head (from which perspective they are strong).
The challenge their theorem puts to compatibalism was recognized by Conway
& Kochen (2009), who write:
‘The tension between human free will and physical determinism has a long history. Long
ago, Lucretius made his otherwise deterministic particles swerve unpredictably to allow
for free will. It was largely the great success of deterministic classical physics that led to
the adoption of determinism by so many philosophers and scientists, particularly those in
ﬁelds remote from current physics. (This remark also applies to “compatibilism”, a now
unnecessary attempt to allow for human free will in a deterministic world.)’
This quotation does not use a precise version of compatibilism, but, as Conway
explains elsewhere, what they mean is that compatibilism in whatever form was
a desperate pre-twentieth-century attempt to save the notion of free will for e.g.
Christianity in the face of the physics of the time, which assumed that the universe
was a mechanical clockwork. Such attempts, then, would no longer be necessary
if the world is, in fact, indeterministic (as Conway and Kochen claim to have at
last proved). Our reformulation of their theorem (which removes the threat of cir-
cularity) gives a more subtle picture: the FWT uses modern physics to challenge
one particular version of compatibilist free will. As such, it only provides indirect
support for libertarian free will, namely by weakening one of its competitors.
To close this philosophical intermezzo, let us note that determinism is seen as
a property of theories. Since it is the job of a deterministic theory to predict the
outcome of any experiment, whether or not it is performed, this obviates the need for
assumptions like counterfactuality in the sense that ‘unperformed experiments have
results’ (which was famously denied by Asher Peres). Such controversial notions of
counterfactuality have effectively been replaced by the considerably more reﬁned
modal counterfactuality of Lewis (at least in our slight reformulation thereof).
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6.4 Technical intermezzo: The GHZ-Theorem
The essence of the proof of the Free Will Theorem lies in the argument that per-
fect correlation together with context-locality implies non-contextuality. Remark-
ably, context-locality is at the same time a special case of non-contextuality, as the
following example illustrates. We take H = C2⊗C2, equipped with the Bell basis
υ0 = (|01〉− |10〉)/
√
2; (6.69)
υ1 = (|01〉+ |10〉)/
√
2; (6.70)
υ2 = (|00〉− |11〉)/
√
2; (6.71)
υ3 = (|00〉+ |11〉)/
√
2, (6.72)
where we use the physicists’ notation
|1〉 = (1,0); (6.73)
|0〉 = (0,1); (6.74)
|i j〉 = |i〉⊗ | j〉. (6.75)
Of course, C2 ⊗C2 ∼= C4 contains the spin-1 Hilbert space C3 of the Kochen–
Specker Theorem as the subspace orthogonal to the vector υ0. Thus we identify C3
with the subspace C˜3 of C4 spanned by the basis vectors υ1,υ2,υ3. The operators
J˜u = 12 (σu⊗12+12⊗σu), (6.76)
where u ∈ R3 is a unit vector as before, and
σu =
3
∑
i=1
σ iui (6.77)
in terms of the Pauli matrices σ i, map υ1 to zero and leave its orthogonal comple-
ment C˜3 stable. Elementary group theory or direct calculation then shows that the
operator Ju on C3 in (6.11) is (unitarily) equivalent to the operator J˜u on C˜3. Since
J˜2u = 12 (σu⊗σu+12⊗12), (6.78)
the Kochen–Specker argument can be rephrased in terms of the operators σu⊗σu.
In particular, for each frame a= (u1,u2,u3), the three operators
(σu1 ⊗σu1 ,σu2 ⊗σu2 ,σu3 ⊗σu3) (6.79)
commute, they each square to one, and their joint eigenvalues are one of the triples:
(−1,−1,−1),(−1,1,1),(1,−1,1),(1,1,−1).
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The eigenvector corresponding to the ﬁrst one is υ0, and hence the others must lie
in C˜3. Hence by Lemma 6.4 any quasi-linear non-contextual hidden variable must
also assign these values, which by Lemma 6.7 is impossible for arbitrary bases.
The key mathematical property of the three operators (6.79) is that they commute,
and together with the unit 12 ⊗ 12 form a maximal set of commuting self-adjoint
matrices on C4. But other such sets could have been chosen by Alice (under whose
sole control the situation so far has been assumed to be), such as a triple of the kind
(σu⊗12,12⊗σv,σu⊗σv),
where u and v are arbitrary unit vectors inR3. Since the third operator is the product
of the ﬁrst two, the joint eigenvalues of this triple, and hence also the assignments
by a quasi-linear non-contextual hidden variable, must be one of the four triples
(1,1,1),(−1,1,−1),(1,−1,−1),(−1,−1,1).
The non-contextuality assumption would then dictate that the outcome of Alice’s
measurement of σu⊗12 be independent of her choice of the setting v in a possible
simultaneous measurement of 12 ⊗σv, and vice versa. Therefore, in a (non-local)
bipartite setting where Alice is only able to measure operators of the type a⊗ 12,
whilst Bob can measure 12 ⊗ b, on the above choice of (commuting) operators,
non-contextuality in the situation where Alice controls everything is mathematically
equivalent to (context) locality in the bipartite Alice & Bob setting.
Further constraints then arise if the system is prepared in a correlated state like
ψ0, which is an eigenstate of σu⊗σv with eigenvalue−1 whenever u= v. So in that
case the values of (σu⊗12,12⊗σv) can only be (1,−1) or (−1,1), yielding perfect
anti-correlation. This is not enough, however, to derive a Free Will Theorem; to do
so with the small single-site Hilbert space C2, one needs a third (non-local) party.
Indeed, the well-known tripartite GHZ-argument may be rephrased as a Free Will
Theorem, as follows. The underlying Hilbert space is
H = C2⊗C2⊗C2 ∼= C8, (6.80)
and hence as a warm-up we ﬁrst (re)prove Theorem 6.5 for n= 8. Suppose we have
a map V : H8(C)→ R as in Deﬁnition 6.1. Write
λ (a)1 =V (σa⊗12⊗12),λ (b)2 =V (12⊗σb⊗12),λ (c)3 =V (12⊗12⊗σc),
where a,b,c can be 1,2,3. From Lemma 6.4 we then have
V (σ1⊗σ2⊗σ2) = λ (1)1 λ (2)2 λ (2)3 ; (6.81)
V (σ2⊗σ1⊗σ2) = λ (2)1 λ (1)2 λ (2)3 ; (6.82)
V (σ2⊗σ2⊗σ1) = λ (2)1 λ (2)2 λ (1)3 ; (6.83)
V (σ1⊗σ1⊗σ1) = λ (1)1 λ (1)2 λ (1)3 . (6.84)
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Furthermore, the four operators on the left-hand side commute and turn out to satisfy
σ1⊗σ2⊗σ2 ·σ2⊗σ1⊗σ2 ·σ2⊗σ2⊗σ1 =−σ1⊗σ1⊗σ1, (6.85)
so that again by Lemma 6.4,
λ (1)1 λ
(2)
2 λ
(2)
3 ·λ (2)1 λ (1)2 λ (2)3 ·λ (2)1 λ (2)2 λ (1)3 =−λ (1)1 λ (1)2 λ (1)3 , (6.86)
i.e. (λ (1)1 λ
(2)
2 λ
(2)
3 )
2 =−1. Since λ (i)j =±1, this is impossible, so thatV cannot exist.
Now, using the notation in the preceding discussion, consider the unit vector
ψGHZ = (|111〉− |000〉)/
√
2, (6.87)
which is a joint eigenstate of each of the four operators on the left-hand side of
(6.81) - (6.84), with eigenvalue +1 for the ﬁrst three, and hence eigenvalue −1
for the fourth, i.e., σ1 ⊗σ1 ⊗σ1. So if setting A = a for Alice (where a ∈ {1,2})
means that she measures F = σa⊗ 12⊗ 12 with outcome λ (a)1 = ±1, and similarly
B = b for Bob and C = c for Cindy mean that they measure G = 12 ⊗σb⊗ 12 and
H = 12⊗12⊗σc with outcomes λ (b)2 =±1 and λ (c)3 =±1, respectively, then in the
state ψGHZ each of the settings gives the correlation
settings (a,b,c) = (1,2,2),(2,1,2),(2,2,1) ⇒ λ (a)1 λ (b)2 λ (c)3 = 1; (6.88)
setting (a,b,c) = (1,1,1) ⇒ λ (a)1 λ (b)2 λ (c)3 = −1. (6.89)
Theorem 6.14. The conjunction of the following assumptions is contradictory:
• Determinism: there is a state space X with associated functions
A,B,C : X →{1,2},F,G,H : X →Λ ,
which completely describes the experiment, in that x∈X determines both settings
(a,b,c) and outcomes (λ1,λ2,λ3) ∈Λ 3 through a= A(x), λ1 = F(x), etc.
• Nature: the experiment (performed in the state ψGHZ) has possible outcomes in
Λ = {−1,1}, subject to the correlations (6.88) - (6.89);
• Freedom: there is a further function Z : X → XZ, in terms of which
F = F(A,B,C,Z), G= G(A,B,C,Z), H = H(A,B,C,Z),
and F, G, H, Z are independent, i.e. for each (a,b,c,z) there is x ∈ X such that
A(x) = a, B(x) = b, C(x) = c, Z(x) = z.
• Locality: F = F(A,Z), G= G(B,Z), and H = H(C,Z).
Proof. Using notation as in the proof of Theorem 6.13, for ﬁxed z ∈ Z we obtain
Fˆ(a,z) = λ (a)1 etc. Nature then leads to the contradiction derived after (6.86). 
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6.5 Bell’s theorems
Two different results are known as “Bell’s Theorem”: the ﬁrst, from his paper in
1964, is Theorem 6.15 below, and the second, dating from 1976, is Theorem 6.18.
The ﬁrst is similar to the Free Will Theorem in both its assumptions and its conclu-
sion, and to make this similarity more obvious we ﬁrst state it for C3 instead of C2.
The difference lies in the probabilistic ﬂavour of Bell’s Theorem, whose empirical
input is not given by the only non-probabilistic consequence to be drawn from the
quantum-mechanical formulae (6.35) - (6.38), viz. the certainty (6.43) of perfect
correlation on identical settings, but rather by the probabilistic formula (6.40), i.e.,
Pψ0(Fi = Gj|Ai = ui,Bj = v j) = 23 sin2 θui,v j (i, j = 1,2,3), (6.90)
where θu,v is the angle between two unit vectors u and v. Furthermore, the state
space X must be upgraded to a probability space (X ,Σ ,μ), carrying functions A
and B (for the settings, which unlike Bell himself—who treated them as labels—
we include among the random variables), F and G (for the outcomes) and ﬁnally Z
(for the hidden variable traditionally called λ ) as random variables, i.e., measurable
functions. This also implies that the target spaces XA to XZ (which is traditionally
called Λ ) must be equipped with some σ -algebra of measurable subsets. But this is
not a big deal, since XA = XB carries a natural Borel structure and XF = XG is ﬁnite.
The probability measure μ is assumed independent of (A,B,F,G), and vice versa.
The measure μ , which gives the “hidden state” of the system that allegedly un-
derlies its quantum-mechanical description, is chosen in such a way that empirical
probabilities (typically obtained from long runs of repeated measurements) are re-
covered as joint conditional probabilities deﬁned by μ and the random variables,
i.e., assuming the settings (a,b) are possible in that P(A= a,B= b)> 0, we put
P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b) = P(F = λ ,G= γ,A= a,B= b)
P(A= a,B= b)
, (6.91)
where the joint probabilities on the right-hand side are given by
P(A= a,B= b) = μ(A= a,B= b}; (6.92)
P(F = λ ,G= γ,A= a,B= b) = μ(F = λ ,G= γ,A= a,B= b}, (6.93)
where μ(A = a,B = b) is shorthand for μ(x ∈ X | A(x) = a,B(x) = b}, etc. This
implies that μ depends on (but may not be determined by) the quantum state ψ0.
On this understanding, the assumptions of Determinism and Locality are the
same as for the Free Will Theorem (except that equations like F(x) = Fˆ(A(x),Z(x))
are merely supposed to hold almost everywhere with respect to μ). Freedom is
now taken to mean that (A,B,Z) are probabilistically independent relative to μ . By
deﬁnition, this also means that the pairs (A,B), (A,Z), and (B,Z) are independent,
so that for any A⊂ XA, B⊂ XB, and (measurable) Z⊂ XZ , deﬁning
P(A ∈ A,B ∈ B,Z ∈ Z) = μ(x ∈ X | A(x) ∈ A,B(x) ∈ B,Z(x) ∈ Z), (6.94)
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and analogous expressions for P(A ∈ A) and P(A ∈ A,B ∈ B), etc., we have
P(A ∈ A,B ∈ B) = P(A ∈ A)P(B ∈ B); (6.95)
P(A ∈ A,Z ∈ Z) = P(A ∈ A)P(Z ∈ Z); (6.96)
P(B ∈ B,Z ∈ Z) = P(B ∈ B)P(Z ∈ Z); (6.97)
P(A ∈ A,B ∈ B,Z ∈ Z) = P(A ∈ A)P(B ∈ B)P(Z ∈ Z). (6.98)
If we ﬁnally deﬁne Nature as the claim that Fˆ and Gˆ are 2-valued and that
P(Fi = Gj|Ai = ui,Bj = v j) = 23 sin2 θui,v j (i, j = 1,2,3), (6.99)
where the left-hand side is the conditional probability deﬁned by μ and the random
variables in question (whereas the left-hand side of (6.90) is the empirical probabil-
ity for the experiment in question, or, equivalently, the quantum-mechanical predic-
tion thereof), then we obtain the following spin-1 version of Bell’s ﬁrst theorem:
Theorem 6.15. Determinism, Freedom, Nature, and Locality are contradictory.
This formulation is literally the same as Theorem 6.13, but the terms have acquired a
different technical meaning now, especially Freedom and Nature. Moreover, purists
would add Probability Theory as an assumption in Bell’s Theorem, as its formalism
is decidedly non-tautological and its interpretation is far from obvious, even in a
classical setting. In any case, the proof is practically the same as in the more familiar
optical version of the EPR-experiment, to which we now turn.
In the classical (sic) form of the experiment, Alice and Bob perform measure-
ments on incoming photons by letting them pass through a polaroid glass whose
axis of polarization makes angle a (Alice) or b (Bob) with (say) the horizontal axis
in the plane orthogonal to the direction of propagation of the photons. Considered
in the light of the previous experiment on spin-1 particles, such a choice of settings
may also be seen as a choice of basis for R3, with the proviso that, assuming (by
convention) the photons move along the y-axis, one basis element u2 = (0,1,0) is
ﬁxed so that the remaining two vectors (u1,u3) must lie in the x-z plane (in which,
on a naive picture, the photons may “vibrate”). This constraint gives rise to bases
u1 = (cosa,0,sina),u2 = (0,1,0),u3 = (−sina,0,cosa), (6.100)
the ﬁrst of which (say) gives the actual direction of the axis of polarization. In any
case, Alice writes down F = 1 if her photon passes her glass at angle a, and F = 0
if it does not; similarly Bob writes G= 1 (pass) or G= 0 (fail) at setting b.
In a quantum-mechanical description of the experiment, the Hilbert space of the
photon pair is C2⊗C2, and the correlated photon state is taken to be
ψ0 = (e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2)/
√
2, (6.101)
where e1 = (1,0) and e2 = (0,1) form the standard basis of C2. The probabilities
(6.35) - (6.38) as predicted by quantum mechanics are now replaced by
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Pψ0(F = 1,G= 1|A= a,B= b) = 12 cos2(a−b); (6.102)
Pψ0(F = 0,G= 0|A= a,B= b) = 12 cos2(a−b); (6.103)
Pψ0(F = 1,G= 0|A= a,B= b) = 12 sin2(a−b), (6.104)
Pψ0((F = 0,G= 1|A= a,B= b) = 12 sin2(a−b), (6.105)
which are also the experimentally measured ones. Instead of (6.90) we then obtain
Pψ0(F = G|A= a,B= b) = sin2(a−b); (6.106)
Pψ0(F = G|A= a,B= b) = cos2(a−b). (6.107)
In particular, if their settings are the same (i.e., a = b), then Alice and Bob will
always ﬁnd the same outcome (perfect correlation), whereas in case they are or-
thogonal (i.e., a = b± π/2), they obtain perfect anti-correlation, in that Alice’s
photon passes whenever Bob’s is blocked, and vice versa. However, this will not be
used. Although it should be obvious from the previous case what the assumptions
in Theorem 6.15 mean for this particular experiment, we make them explicit:
• Determinism means that there is a probability space (X ,Σ ,μ) with associated
(measurable) functions
A : X → [0,π],B : X → [0,π],F : X →{0,1},G : X →{0,1}, (6.108)
which completely describe the experiment in the sense that x ∈ X determines
both its settings a= A(x),b= B(x) and its outcomes λ = F(x),γ = G(x).
• Freedom stipulates that there is a (measurable) function Z : X → XZ such that:
– F = F(A,B,Z) and G= G(A,B,Z);
– (A,B,Z) are probabilistically independent relative to μ .
• Locality means that F(A,B,Z) = F(A,Z) and G(A,B,Z) = G(B,Z).
• Nature states that the empirical as well as theoretical probabilities (6.106) for the
experiment are reproduced as conditional joint probabilities given by μ through
P(F = G|A= a,B= b) = sin2(a−b). (6.109)
Theorem 6.15 then holds verbatim for this situation, with the following proof.
Proof. Determinism and Freedom imply
P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b) = PABZ(Fˆ = λ , Gˆ= γ|Aˆ= a, Bˆ= b), (6.110)
where we use the notation (6.50) - (6.51), the function Aˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → XA is
projection on the ﬁrst coordinate, likewise the function Bˆ : XA ×XB ×XZ → XB is
projection on the second, and PABZ is the joint probability on XA×XB×XZ induced
by the triple (A,B,Z) and the probability measure μ; by independence, PABZ is a
product measure on XA×XB×XZ . According to Locality, Fˆ(a,b,z) does not depend
on b, whilst Gˆ(a,b,z) does not depend on a.
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For ﬁxed settings (a,b), we may therefore deﬁne the following functions on XZ :
Fˆa(z) = Fˆ(a,z); (6.111)
Gˆb(z) = Gˆ(b,z). (6.112)
A brief computation then yields
PABZ(Fˆ = λ , Gˆ= γ|Aˆ= a, Bˆ= b) = PZ(Fˆa = λ , Gˆb = γ), (6.113)
where PZ is the joint probability on XZ deﬁned by Z and μ . Therefore, from (6.110),
P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b) = PZ(Fˆa = λ , Gˆb = γ). (6.114)
Nature then gives the crucial result
PZ(Fˆa = Gˆb) = sin2(a−b). (6.115)
Lemma 6.16. Any four {0,1}-valued random variables (F1,F2,G1,G2) satisfy
P(F1 = G1)≤ P(F1 = G2)+P(F2 = G1)+P(F2 = G2). (6.116)
This lemma (said to go back to Boole) is very easy to prove directly, but for com-
pleteness’s sake we mention that it also follows from Proposition 6.17 below.
Taking F1 = Fˆa1 , F2 = Fˆa2 , G1 = Gˆb1 , G2 = Gˆb2 , and P=PZ , for suitable values of
(a1,a2,b1,b2) this inequality is violated by (6.115). Take, for example, a2 = b2 = 3x,
a1 = 0, and b1 = x. The inequality (6.116) then assumes the form f (x)≥ 0 for
f (x) = sin2(3x)+ sin2(2x)− sin2(x).
But in fact, f (x)< 0 for continuously many values of x ∈ [0,2π], see plot. 
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Graph of x → sin2(3x)+ sin2(2x)− sin2(x), showing (in the region where it is
negative) that quantum mechanics violates the Bell inequality (6.116).
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Lemma 6.16 is a special case of a more general result.
Proposition 6.17. Let Fi : X → [−1,1] and Gj : X → [−1,1], where (X ,Σ ,μ) is
some probability space, be two parametrized random variables, i, j = 1,2. Then the
two-point function 〈FiGj〉=
∫
X dμ FiGj satisﬁes the CHSH-inequality
|〈F1G1〉+ 〈F1G2〉+ 〈F2G1〉−〈F2G2〉| ≤ 2. (6.117)
If Fi and Gj just take the values ±1, then (6.116) is a special case of (6.117).
Proof. In terms of the function Φ = F1 · (G1+G2)+F2 · (G1−G2), we may write
〈F1G1〉+ 〈F1G2〉+ 〈F2G1〉−〈F2G2〉=
∫
X
dμ Φ . (6.118)
Since |Fi(x)| ≤ 1 and |Gj(x)| ≤ 1 by assumption, we have |Φ(x)| ≤ 2 and hence∣∣∣∣∫X dμ(x)Φ(x)
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ∫X dμ(x) |Φ(x)| ≤ 2, (6.119)
since μ is a probability measure. To prove the the last claim, we just note that
P(Fi = Gj)−P(Fi = Gj) = 〈FiGj〉;
P(Fi = Gj)+P(Fi = Gj) = 1. 
In Bell’s second (1976) theorem on stochastic hidden variables, the assump-
tion of Determinism is dropped, and all we have is a theory stating conditional
probabilities P(F = λ ,G = γ|A = a,B = b,x) for the outcomes of the above bi-
partite experiment given some hidden variable x, as well as the single-wing versions
P(F = λ |A = a) and P(G = γ|B = b,x). Here F,G,A,B are just notational devices
to record such outcomes, which are no longer (necessarily) represented as random
variables. On this new understanding of the notation, the Nature assumption is for-
mulated just as before, cf. (6.109). We do assume the existence of a probability
space (X ,Σ ,μ) and of conditional probabilities
P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b,x), P(F = λ |A= a,x), P(G= γ|B= b,x),
deﬁned μ-a.e. in x, in which the state of the world is speciﬁed as being x ∈ X . In
terms of this space, the Freedom assumption means that
P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b)=
∫
X
dμ(x)P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b,x), (6.120)
for any settings (a,b), of which μ is independent (as the notation already indicated).
The crucial assumption replacing Determinism is Bell locality, which reads
P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b,x) = P(F = λ |A= a,x) ·P(G= γ|B= b,x). (6.121)
Bell’s second theorem for stochastic hidden variable theories reads as follows.
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Theorem 6.18. Nature, Freedom, and Bell locality are contradictory.
Proof. The idea of the proof is to introduce an artiﬁcial probability space in order
to recover the framework of Theorem 6.15. To this end, we take
X˜ = [0,1]× [0,1]×X ; (6.122)
dμ˜(s, t,x) = ds ·dt ·dμ(x). (6.123)
where we denoted the elements of X˜ by (s, t,x). On X˜ , deﬁne random variables
F˜a(s, t,x) = 1[0,P(F=1|A=a,x)](s); (6.124)
G˜b(s, t,x) = 1[0,P(G=1|B=b,x)](t), (6.125)
where 1Δ is the indicator function for Δ ⊆ [0,1]. Writing, as usual,
P˜(F˜a = λ , G˜b = γ) =
∫
X˜
dμ˜(s, t,x){(s, t,x) ∈ X˜ | F˜a(s, t,x) = λ , G˜b(s, t,x) = γ},
we obtain (ﬁrst for λ = γ = 1, from which the other cases follow):
P˜(F˜a = λ , G˜b = γ) =
∫
X
dμ(x)P(F = λ |A= a,x) ·P(G= γ|B= b,x). (6.126)
With Freedom and Bell locality, this yields
P(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b) = P˜(F˜a = λ , G˜b = γ), (6.127)
as in (6.114), so that the proof may be completed as for Theorem 6.15. 
Let us note that since in Bell’s second theorem the settings (a,b) are treated as free
parameters to begin with, the difference between X and Z evaporates, so that in the
above formulae one might as well have replaced (X ,μ) by the space (XZ ,μZ) that
describes all relevant degrees of freedom except the settings (i.e., the experimental-
ist, in either human or machine form). Either way, Bell’s locality condition may be
disentangled into the following conditions (introduced by Jarrett and Shimony):
1. Parameter Independence (PI):
P(λ |a,b,x) = P(λ |a,x); (6.128)
P(γ|a,b,x) = P(γ|b,x); (6.129)
2. Outcome Independence (OI):
P(λ |a,b,γ,x) = P(λ |a,b,x); (6.130)
P(γ|a,b,λ ,x) = P(γ|a,b,x), (6.131)
where we have abbreviated P(F = λ |A = a,B = b,x) by P(λ |a,b,x), etc., and have
used the following notation (which states identities in case one has (6.91) - (6.93)):
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P(λ |a,b,x) ≡∑
γ
P(λ ,γ|a,b,x); (6.132)
P(γ|a,b,x) ≡∑
λ
P(λ ,γ|a,b,x); (6.133)
P(λ |a,b,γ,x) ≡ P(λ ,γ|a,b,x)
P(γ|a,b,x) ; (6.134)
P(γ|a,b,λ ,x) ≡ P(λ ,γ|a,b,x)
P(λ |a,b,x) , (6.135)
It is easy to see that Bell locality is equivalent to the conjunction of PI and OI.
Note that the former (PI), akin to Locality, is a hidden or ‘subsurface’ version of
the no signaling property of the ‘surface’ probabilities, which states that
P(λ |a,b)≡∑
γ
P(λ ,γ|a,b)
is independent of b (and vice versa). But a violation of PI only leads to signaling if x
can be operationally controlled, similar to the way in which experimental physicists
prepare quantum states ψ . Hence it is reassuring that quantum mechanics satisﬁes
PI if we see the quantum state ψ as a hidden variable: assuming
P(λ ,γ|a,b,x) = Pψ0(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b), (6.136)
as computed in (6.102) - (6.105), PI is valid but OI is not. First, for λ = 0 or λ = 1,
P(λ |a,b,x) = ∑
γ=0,1
Pψ0(F = λ ,G= γ|a,b) = 12 cos2(a−b)+ 12 sin2(a−b) = 12 ,
(6.137)
which is independent of b, and likewise P(γ|a,b,x) = 12 , independently of a. This
yields PI, which a similar computation shows to be true for any quantum state. On
the other hand, given this result, OI would require
Pψ0(F = λ ,G= γ|A= a,B= b) = Pψ0(F = λ |A= a) ·Pψ0(G= γ|B= b),
which is false, since by (6.102) - (6.105), Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes are correlated.
Hence Bell locality is violated by quantum mechanics, but this does not imply
that “quantum mechanics is nonlocal” (as some say). Bell’s is a very speciﬁc locality
condition invented as a constraint on hidden variable theories. In another important
sense, viz. Einstein locality, quantum mechanics is local, in that observables with
spacelike separated localization regions commute (this is the case in quantum ﬁeld
theory, but also in any bipartite experiment of the type considered here, where Al-
ice’s operators commute with Bob’s just by deﬁnition of the tensor product).
On the other hand, deterministic theories, which in the present context are deﬁned
as those for which all conditional probabilities like P(λ ,γ|a,b,x) are either zero or
one (in which case one may introduce random variables reproducing these probabil-
ities), violate PI but satisfy OI, at least if they reproduce the Born probabilities (such
as Bohmian mechanics). Hence such theories violate Bell locality.
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Finally, Bell-type inequalities like (6.117) also give information about quantum
mechanics itself, particularly about the degree of entanglement of states. Let H1 and
H2 be Hilbert spaces, with tensor product H1 ⊗H2. A unit vector ψ ∈ H1 ⊗H2 is
called uncorrelated if it is of the form ψ = ϕ1⊗ϕ2, where ϕk ∈Hk are unit vectors,
k = 1,2, and correlated otherwise. Clearly, the vectors (6.34) and (6.101) used in
the experiments so far are correlated. The simplest result is then as follows.
Theorem 6.19. Let a1 and a2 be self-adjoint operators on H1, and let b1 and b2 be
self-adjoint operators on H2, each with spectrum contained in [−1,1] (equivalently
‖Xa‖ ≤ 1, etc.). Let ψ be a unit vector in H1⊗H2, and deﬁne two-point functions
〈FiGj〉= 〈ψ,ai⊗b jψ〉. (6.138)
If ψ is uncorrelated, then the Bell inequality (6.117) holds.
Proof. This follows from the factorization property
〈FiGj〉= 〈ϕ1⊗ϕ2,ai⊗b jϕ1⊗ϕ2〉= 〈ϕ1,aiϕ1〉 · 〈ϕ2,b jϕ2〉= 〈Fi〉 · 〈Gj〉, (6.139)
where 〈Fi〉= 〈ϕ1,aiϕ1〉 and 〈Gj〉= 〈ϕ2,b jϕ2〉. For either sign, this property yields
〈F2(G1−G2)〉= 〈F2〉〈G1〉(1±〈F1〉〈G2〉)−〈F2〉〈G2〉(1±〈F1〉〈G1〉). (6.140)
The spectral assumption implies that |〈Fi〉| ≤ 1 and |〈Gj〉| ≤ 1, which will be used
directly below, as well as its consequence |1±〈F1〉〈G2〉|= 1±〈Fi〉〈Gj〉. Hence
|〈F2(G1−G2)〉| ≤ |1±〈F1〉〈G2〉|+ |1±〈F1〉〈G1〉|
= 1±〈F1〉〈G2〉+1±〈F1〉〈G1〉
= 2±〈F1(G1+G2)〉. (6.141)
Similarly,
|〈F1(G1+G2)〉| ≤ 2±〈F2(G1−G2)〉, (6.142)
so that, writing Φ = 〈F1G1〉+ 〈F1G2〉+ 〈F2G1〉−〈F2G2〉, for either sign ± we have
|Φ | ≤ |〈F1(G1+G2)〉|+ |〈F2(G1−G2)〉| ≤ 4±Φ (6.143)
If Φ ≥ 0 we choose the minus sign, whereas for Φ < 0 we take the plus sign. Either
way, we obtain |Φ | ≤ 2, which is the inequality (6.117). 
This result is actually much more general (as hinted at by the way that the proof
only uses the uncorrelated vector state ψ = ϕ1 ⊗ϕ2). The simplest generalization
is to replace pure states by mixed states, where we say that a density operator ρ
on H1 ⊗H2 is uncorrelated if it is of the form ρ = ∑i piρ1 ⊗ρ2, where the pi are
probabilities and ρk is a density matrix on Hk, k= 1,2. Then all uncorrelated density
matrices satisfy the inequality (6.117). Even more generally, uncorrelated states on
C*-algebras or von Neumann algebras A⊗B satisfy (6.117), see Notes.
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6.6 The Colbeck–Renner Theorem
One may try to strengthen Bell’s second theorem by weakening its assumptions. A
remarkable result in this direction states that, roughly speaking, any probabilistic
hidden variable theory that satisﬁes Freedom and Parameter Independence and is
compatible with quantum mechanics adds nothing to quantum mechanics. In other
words, it appears that quantum mechanics “cannot be extended”, or “is complete”.
In fact, the result turns out to be more modest than this summary suggests, since
the reasoning required to prove the claim hinges on certain assumptions which are
satisﬁed by quantum mechanics itself, but might seem unnatural for a hidden vari-
able theory. In any case, we have to state our notation and assumptions very clearly.
Deﬁnition 6.20. A hidden variable theory T underlying quantum mechanics con-
sists of a measurable space (X ,Σ) whose points x label conditional probabilities
P(a1 = λ1, . . . ,an = λn|x)≡ P(a= λ |x)
for the possible outcomes λ = (λ1, . . . ,λn) of a measurement of any family a =
(a1, . . . ,an) of n commuting self-adjoint operators on any Hilbert space H.
These formal conditional probabilities are a priori only supposed to satisfy
0≤ P(a = λ |x)≤ 1; (6.144)
∑
λ
P(a = λ |x) = 1. (6.145)
Apart from these probabilities, for each Hilbert space H and any pure state e ∈
P1(H), the theory T yields a classical state μe, i.e., a probability measure on X.
As the notation indicates, μe depends on e only and hence is independent of a and
λ . From the point of view of T , a quantum state is a probability measure on X! In
what follows we assume for simplicity that H is ﬁnite-dimensional, so that e = eψ
for some unit vector ψ ∈H. With slight abuse of notation we then write μψ for μeψ .
An important special case will be the bipartite setting H =H1⊗H2, where Alice
and Bob measure self-adjoint operators X and Y on H1 and H2, respectively, so that
n= 2, a1 = X⊗1H2 , a2 = 1H1 ⊗Y.
We then introduce settings c= (a,b), as in the previous sections, so that we typically
look at expressions like P(Xa = λ1,Yb = λ2|x). The other case of interest will simply
be n = 1 with a1 ≡ a, λ1 ≡ λ ; indeed, this will be the case in the statement of the
theorem (the bipartite case playing a role only in the proof, though a crucial one!).
The following notation will be quite important to the argument. An equality
Pψ(a= λ |x) = α(x), (6.146)
where α : X → [0,1] is measurable (often even constant), abbreviates:
P(a= λ |x) = α(x) for almost every x with respect to the measure μψ .
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That is, there is a subset X ′ ⊂ X such that μψ(X ′) = 0 and Pψ(a= λ |x) =α(x) holds
for any x ∈ X\X ′. If X is ﬁnite, this simply means that the equality holds for any x
for which μψ({x})> 0. Since this notation may render equalities like
Pψ(a= λ |x) = Pϕ(a′ = λ ′|x), (6.147)
ambiguous, we explicitly deﬁne (6.147) as the double implication
Pψ(a= λ |x) = α(x )⇔ Pϕ(a′ = λ ′|x) = α(x).
Furthermore, for ε → 0 we write
Pψ(a= λ |x) ε≈ Pϕ(a′ = λ ′|x)⇔ Pψ(a= λ |x) = Pϕ(a′ = λ ′|x)+O(
√
ε), (6.148)
as well as
ψ
ε≈ ϕ ⇔ (1− ε)≤ |〈ψ,ϕ〉| ≤ 1. (6.149)
We are now ready to state our assumptions for the Colbeck–Renner Theorem:
• Compatibility with Quantum Mechanics (CQ): for any unit vector ψ ∈ H,∫
X
dμψ(x)P(a= λ |x) = pψ(a= λ ), (6.150)
where the quantum-mechanical prediction pψ(a= λ ) is given by the Born rule
pψ(a= λ ) = 〈ψ,e(1)λ1 · · ·e
(n)
λn ψ〉, (6.151)
cf. (2.21), where e(i)λi is the spectral projection on the eigenspace Hλi ⊂ H of ai.• Unitary Invariance (UI): for any unit vector ψ ∈ H and unitary u on H,
Puψ(a= λ |x) = Pψ(u−1au= λ |x). (6.152)
• Continuity of Probabilities (CP: If ψ ε≈ ϕ , then Pψ(a= λ |x) ε≈ Pϕ(a= λ |x).
In the remaining axioms, H =H1⊗H2, and a and b are self-adjoint operators on H1
and H2, respectively (duly identiﬁed with operators a⊗1H2 and 1H1 ⊗b on H).
• Parameter Independence (PI):
∑
γ∈σ(b)
P(a= λ ,b= γ|x) = P(a= λ |x); (6.153)
∑
λ∈σ(a)
P(a= λ ,b= γ|x) = P(b= γ|x). (6.154)
• Product Extension (PE): for any pair of states ψ1 ∈ H1, ψ2 ∈ H2,
Pψ1(a= λ |x) = Pψ1⊗ψ2(a= λ |x). (6.155)
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• Schmidt Extension (SE): if υi ∈H1 (i= 1, . . . ,dim(H)) are eigenstates of a, then
for arbitrary orthogonal states ui ∈ H2 and coefﬁcients ci > 0 with ∑i c2i = 1,
P∑i ci·υi(a= x|x) = P∑i ci·υi⊗ui(a= x|x). (6.156)
Note that PI makes sense, because (6.151) and (6.150) imply that for pψ(a = λ )
to be nonzero we must have λi ∈ σ(ai) for each i. All assumptions are satisﬁed by
quantum mechanics itself (seen as a hidden variable theory with ψ as the “hidden”
variable x). In the context of hidden variable theories, though, one might doubt the
plausibility of UI, CP, and SE. But we need all these assumptions to prove:
Theorem 6.21. If T satisﬁes CQ, UI, CP, PI, PE, and SE, then for any (ﬁnite-
dimensional) Hilbert space H, unit vector ψ ∈ H, and operator a ∈ B(H)sa,
Pψ(a= λ |x) = pψ(a= λ ). (6.157)
In other words, the hidden variable x is even more hidden than expected, since know-
ing its value has no effect on the probabilities for the outcomes of experiments.
Proof. We ﬁrst assume (without loss of generality) that a is nondegenerate as a self-
adjoint matrix, in that it has distinct eigenvalues (λ1, . . . ,λdim(H)); this assumption
will be removed at the end of the proof. The proof consists of three steps.
1. The theorem holds for H = C2 and any pair (a,ψ) for which
pψ(a= λ1) = pψ(a= λ2) = 1/2, (6.158)
This only requires assumptions CQ, PI, and SE.
2. The theorem holds for H = Cl , l < ∞ arbitrary, and any pair (a,ψ) for which
pψ(a= λ1) = · · ·= pψ(a= λl) = 1/l. (6.159)
This is just a slight extension of step 1 and uses the same three assumptions.
3. The theorem holds in general. This requires all assumptions (as well as step 2).
Proof of step 1. Let H =C2, with basis (υ1,υ2) of eigenvectors of a, so that ψ ∈C2
may be written as
ψ = (υ1+υ2)/
√
2. (6.160)
Without loss of generality, we may assume that λ1 = 1 and λ2 =−1. We now relabel
a as a0 and extend it to a family of operators (ak)k=0,1,...,2N−1 by ﬁxing an integer
N > 1, putting θk = kπ/2N, and deﬁning
ck = eθk+π − eθk , (6.161)
where, for any angle θ ∈ [0,2π], the operator eθ = |θ〉〈θ | is the orthogonal projec-
tion onto the one-dimensional subspace spanned by the unit vector
|θ〉= sin(θ/2) ·υ1+ cos(θ/2) ·υ2. (6.162)
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In the bipartite setting, we have operators ak = ck⊗12 and bk = 12⊗ck on C2⊗C2,
as well as a maximally correlated (Bell) state ψAB ∈ C2⊗C2, given by
ψAB =
1√
2
(υ1⊗υ1+υ2⊗υ2). (6.163)
Using assumptions PI and SE, we then have, for i= 1,2 λ1 = 1, and λ2 =−1,
Pψ(a= λi|x) = PψAB(a0 = λi|x). (6.164)
The quantum-mechanical prediction is
pψAB(a0 = 1) = pψAB(a0 =−1) = 12 . (6.165)
Our goal is to show that also for each x ∈ X , knowing x is irrelevant in that
PψAB(a0 = 1|x) = PψAB(a0 =−1|x) = 12 . (6.166)
To this effect we introduce the combination of probabilities
I(N)(x) = P(a0 = b2N−1|x)+ ∑
k∈KN ,l∈LN ,|k−l|=1
P(ak = bl |x), (6.167)
where KN = {0,2, . . . ,2N−2} and LN = {1,3, . . . ,2N−1}. Our ﬁrst inequality is
|P(ak = λi|x)−P(bl = λi|x)| = |P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)+P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)
− P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)+P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)|
= |P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)−P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)|
≤ P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)+P(ak = λi,bl = λi|x)
= P(ak = bl |x), (6.168)
where i= 1,2, and we used PI. This implies a second inequality: since a2N =−a0,
|P(a0 = 1|x)−P(a0 =−1|x)| = |P(a0 = 1|x)−P(a2N = 1|x)|
≤ ∑
k,l,|k−l|=1
|P(ak = 1|x)−P(bl = 1|x)|
≤ ∑
k,l,|k−l|=1
P(ak = bl |x)≤ I(N)(x).
Integrating this with respect to the measure μψAB and using CQ gives∫
X
dμψAB(x) |P(a0 = 1|x)−P(a0 =−1|x)| ≤
∫
X
dμψAB(x) I
(N)(x) = I(N)ψAB . (6.169)
We wish to invoke the corresponding quantum-mechanical expression, deﬁned by
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I(N)ψAB = pψAB(a0 = b2N−1)+ ∑
k∈KN ,l∈LN ,|k−l|=1
pψAB(ak = bl). (6.170)
A straightforward calculation shows that this expression is equal to
I(N)ψAB = 2N sin
2(π/4N). (6.171)
Since limN→∞ I
(N)
ψAB = 0, letting N → ∞ in (6.169) therefore yields (6.166). From
(6.164) we then obtain (6.158).
Proof of step 2. Let H = Cl and let (υi)li=1 be an orthonormal basis of eigenvectors
of a, with corresponding eigenvalues λi, and phase factors for the eigenvectors υi
such that ci > 0 (and of course, ∑i c2i = 1) in the expansion
ψ =∑
i
ciυi. (6.172)
The case of interest will be c1 = · · · = cl = 1/l, but ﬁrst we merely assume that
c1 = c2 (the same reasoning applies to any other pair), with λ1 = 1 and λ2 = −1
(which involves no loss of generality either and just simpliﬁes the notation). The
other positive coefﬁcients ci are arbitrary. Generalizing (6.166), we will show that
Pψ(a= 1|x) = Pψ(a=−1|x). (6.173)
This shows that if two Born probabilities deﬁned by some quantum state eψ are
equal, then the underlying hidden variable probabilities must be equal μψ -a.e., too.
Eq. (6.159) immediately follows from this result by taking all ci to be equal.
As in step 1, we pass to the bipartite setting, introducing two copies of H = Cl
denoted by HA = HB = Cl , and deﬁne the correlated state
ψAB =∑
i
ci ·υi⊗υi (6.174)
in HA ⊗HB. Eq. (6.164) again follows from assumptions PI and SE. Throughout
the argument of step 1, we now replace each probability P(ak = λi,bl = γ j|x) by an
adapted probability P(1)(ak = λi,bl = γ j|x), deﬁned as the conditional probability
P(1)(ak = λi,bl = γ2|x) = P(ak = λi,bl = γ2||λi|= |γ2|= 1,x)
=
P(ak = λi,bl = γ2, |λi|= |γ2|= 1|x)
P(|λi|= |γ2|= 1|x) , (6.175)
for all x for which P(|λi|= |γ2|= 1|x)> 0, whereas
P(1)(ak = λi,bl = γ2|x) = 0 (6.176)
whenever P(|λi| = |γ2| = 1|x) = 0. The same argument then yields (6.169), with P
replaced by P(1) but with the same right-hand side. As in step 1,
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P(1)ψAB(a0 = 1|x) = P(1)ψAB(a0 =−1|x), (6.177)
which implies that
PψAB(a0 = 1|x) = PψAB(a0 =−1|x), (6.178)
either because both sides vanish (if P(|λi|= |γ2|= 1|x) = 0), or because (in the op-
posite case) the denominator P(|λi|= |γ2|= 1|x) cancels from both sides of (6.177).
Combined with (6.164), eq. (6.178) proves (6.173) and hence establishes step 2.
Proof of step 3. This is the most difﬁcult step in the proof, relying on a technique
wittily called embezzlement (which we only need for maximally entangled states).
We will deal with three Hilbert spaces, namely H = Cl , H ′ = Cm, and H ′′ = Cn
(where n = mN for some large N, see below), each with some ﬁxed orthonormal
basis (υi)li=1, (υ
′
j)
m
j=1, and (υ
′′
k )
n
k=1, respectively. Given a further number mi ≤ m,
we now list the nm basis vectors υ ′′k ⊗υ ′j of H ′′ ⊗H ′ in two different orders:
1. υ ′′1 ⊗υ ′1, . . . ,υ ′′n ⊗υ ′1,υ ′′1 ⊗υ ′2, . . . ,υ ′′n ⊗υ ′2, . . . ,υ ′′1 ⊗υ ′m, . . . ,υ ′′n ⊗υ ′m;
2. υ ′′1 ⊗υ ′1, . . . ,υ ′′1 ⊗υ ′mi ,υ ′′2 ⊗υ ′1, . . . ,υ ′′2 ⊗υ ′mi , . . . ,υ ′′n ⊗υ ′1, . . . ,υ ′′n ⊗υ ′mi , . . . ,
where the remaining vectors (i.e., those of the form υ ′′k ⊗υ ′j for 1≤ k≤ n and j>mi)
are listed in some arbitrary order.
Deﬁne
u(mi) : H ′′ ⊗H ′ → H ′′ ⊗H ′ (6.179)
as the unitary operator that maps the ﬁrst list on the second. We will need the explicit
expression
u(mi)(υ ′′k ⊗υ ′1) = υ ′′sik ⊗υ
′
jik
, (6.180)
where for given k = 1, . . . ,n the numbers sik = 1, . . . ,ni (where ni is the smallest
integer such that nimi ≥ n) and jik = 1, . . . ,ni are uniquely determined by
k = (sik−1)mi+ jik. (6.181)
We will actually work with two copies of H ′′ ⊗H ′, called H ′′A ⊗H ′A and H ′′B ⊗H ′B,
with ensuing copies of u(mi)A and u
(mi)
B of u
(mi), and hence, leaving the isomorphism
H ′′A ⊗H ′A⊗H ′′B ⊗H ′B ∼= H ′′A ⊗H ′′B ⊗H ′A⊗H ′B (6.182)
implicit, we obtain a unitary operator
u(mi)A ⊗u(mi)B : H ′′A ⊗H ′′B ⊗H ′A⊗H ′B → H ′′A ⊗H ′′B ⊗H ′A⊗H ′B. (6.183)
The point of all this is that the unit vector
κn ∈ H ′′A ⊗H ′′A ; (6.184)
κn =
1√
C(n)
n
∑
k=1
υ ′′k ⊗υ ′′k , (6.185)
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where C(n) = ∑nk=1 1/k, acts as a “catalyst” in producing the maximally entangled
state
ϕ ∈ H ′A⊗H ′B; (6.186)
ϕ =
1√
mi
mi
∑
j=1
υ ′j⊗υ ′j, (6.187)
from the uncorrelated state υ ′1⊗υ ′1 ∈ H ′A⊗H ′B, in that for any mi ≤ m,
u(mi)A ⊗u(mi)B (κn⊗υ ′1⊗υ ′1)
ε/2≈ κn⊗ϕ. (6.188)
Here ε = 1/N if n= m2N . This follows straightforwardly from (6.183) - (6.187).
After this preparation we are ready for the proof of step 3, continuing to use the
notation established at the beginning of step 2, especially (6.172). As in step 1, we
introduce two copies HA = HB = Cl of H, as well as two states
ψAB =∑
i
ci ·υi⊗υi ∈ HA⊗HB; (6.189)
ψ ′′′AB = κn⊗υ ′1⊗υ ′1⊗ψAB ∈ H ′′′A ⊗H ′′′B , (6.190)
where κn is given by (6.185), we put
H ′′′ = H ′′ ⊗H ′ ⊗H, (6.191)
and in our notation we have ignored the obvious permutations of factors in the tensor
product. For any ε > 0, pick c′i ∈ R+ such that (c′i)2 ∈Q+ and
|c′i− ci|< ε/dim(H), (6.192)
which implies that, in the sense of (6.149), we have
∑
i
c′iυi
ε/2≈ ∑
i
ciυi. (6.193)
Suppose
c′i =
√
pi/qi, (6.194)
with pi,qi ∈ N and gcd(pi,qi) = 1, and deﬁne
mi = pi∏
i′ =i
qi′ . (6.195)
Consequently, writing
q= 1/
√
∑
i′
mi′ , (6.196)
the following quotient is independent of i:
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c′i√
mi
= q. (6.197)
Given the integers mi thus obtained, we deﬁne a unitary operator
u : H ′′′ → H ′′′; (6.198)
u=
l
∑
i=1
u(mi)⊗|υi〉〈υi|, (6.199)
where u(mi) is deﬁned in (6.180). From this deﬁnition, with additional labels to de-
note the copies uA : H ′′′A → H ′′′A and uB : H ′′′B → H ′′′B , and (6.188), and writing
ξ i j = υi⊗υ ′j ∈ H⊗H ′, (6.200)
with corresponding copies
ξ i jiAA′ ∈ HA⊗H ′A; (6.201)
ξ i jiBB′ ∈ HB⊗H ′B, (6.202)
we then obtain the important relations
1H ′′′A ⊗1H ′′′B (ψ
′′′
AB) = κn⊗
l
∑
i=1
ci ·ξ i1AA′ ⊗ξ i1BB′ ; (6.203)
uA⊗1H ′′′B (ψ
′′′
AB) =
1√
C(n)
l
∑
i=1
n
∑
k=1
ci√
k
·υ ′′sk ⊗υ ′′k ⊗ξ
i jik
AA′ ⊗ξ i1BB′ ; (6.204)
1H ′′′A ⊗uB(ψ
′′′
AB) =
1√
C(n)
l
∑
i=1
n
∑
k=1
ci√
k
·υ ′′k ⊗υ ′′sk ⊗ξ i1AA′ ⊗ξ
i jik
BB′ ; (6.205)
uA⊗uB(ψ ′′′AB)
ε≈ q ·κn⊗
l
∑
i=1
mi
∑
ji=1
ξ i jiAA′ ⊗ξ i jiBB′ . (6.206)
Here the right-hand sides of (6.203) - (6.206) have been arranged so as to obtain
vectors in the six-fold tensor product
H ′′A ⊗H ′′B ⊗HA⊗H ′A⊗HB⊗H ′B.
We will repeatedly invoke the following lemma, whose proof just unfolds the
notation (on the appropriate identiﬁcation of a with a⊗1H2 and of b with 1H1 ⊗b).
Lemma 6.22. Assume PI and UI. For any pair of unitary operators u1 on H1 and
u2 on H2, and any unit vector ψ ∈ H1⊗H2, one has
P(u1⊗1H2 )ψ(b= γ|x) = Pψ(b= γ|x); (6.207)
P(1H1⊗u2)ψ(a= λ |x) = Pψ(λ = x|x). (6.208)
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Since we assume that a is nondegenerate, there is a bijective correspondence
between its eigenvalues a= λi and its eigenvectors υi. Instead of P(a= λi) dressed
with whatever parameters x or ψ , we may then write P(υi), where a is understood,
and analogously for the more complicated operators on tensor products of Hilbert
space appearing below. Repeatedly using Lemma 6.22, we proceed as follows.
• From Step 2, using the notation explained below (6.172),
P
q·∑li=1∑
mi
ji=1
ξ i ji
BB′
(ξ i jBB′ |x) = q2. (6.209)
• From (6.156) in PE and (6.209),
P
q·∑i, ji ξ
i ji
AA′ ⊗ξ
i ji
BB′
(ξ i jBB′ |x) = q2. (6.210)
• From (6.155) in SE and (6.210),
P
q·κn⊗∑i, ji ξ
i ji
AA′ ⊗ξ
i ji
BB′
(ξ i jBB′ |x) = q2. (6.211)
• From (6.211), CP (whose notation we use), and (6.206),
P(uA⊗uB)ψ ′′′AB(ξ
i j
BB′ |x)
ε≈ q2. (6.212)
• Recall the number m (satisfying m≥mi for all i). From (6.212) and Lemma 6.22,
P(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ
′′′
AB
(ξ i jiBB′ |x)
ε≈ q2 ( ji = 1, . . . ,mi);
P(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ
′′′
AB
(ξ i jiBB′ |x)
ε≈ 0 ( ji = mi+1, . . . ,m). (6.213)
We now start a different line of argument, to be combined with (6.213) in due course.
• From PE, SE, and (6.172), with υ iA ∈ HA denoting υi ∈ H, we have
Pψ(a= λi|x)≡ Pψ(υi|x) = Pκn⊗∑i ci·ξ i1AA′ ⊗ξ i1BB′ (υ
i
A|x). (6.214)
• Using Lemma 6.22, (6.203), and (6.204),
Pκn⊗∑i ci·ξ i1AA′ ⊗ξ i1BB′
(υ iA|x) = P(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ ′′′AB(υ
i
A|x), (6.215)
and hence
Pψ(a= λi|x) = P(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ ′′′AB(υ
i
A|x). (6.216)
• From quantum mechanics, notably (6.151), and (6.205), for any i′ = i we have
p(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ
′′′
AB
(υ i
′
A ⊗ξ i jiBB′) = 0. (6.217)
• From CQ and (6.217), for any i′ = i,
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P(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ
′′′
AB
(υ i
′
A ,ξ
i ji
BB′ |x) = 0. (6.218)
• From PI,
P(υ i
′
A |x) =∑
i, ji
P(υ i
′
A ,ξ
i ji
BB′ |x); (6.219)
P(ξ i jiBB′ |x) =∑
i′
P(υ i
′
A ,ξ
i ji
BB′ |x). (6.220)
• From (6.218), (6.219), and (6.220),
P(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ
′′′
AB
(υ iA|x) =∑
ji
P(1H′′′A ⊗uB)ψ
′′′
AB
(ξ i jiBB′ |x). (6.221)
Finally, from (6.214), (6.221), (6.213), and (6.197) we obtain
Pψ(a= λi|x) ε≈
mi
∑
ji
q2 = mi ·q2 = c2i . (6.222)
Since ci > 0 we have c2i = |ci|2; using (6.192) and letting ε → 0 then proves step 3:
Pψ(a= λi|x) = |ci|2 = pψ(a= λi). (6.223)
Finally, we remove our standing assumption that the spectrum of a be nondegen-
erate. In the degenerate case one has
pψ(a= λi) =∑
ji
pψ(υ ji), (6.224)
where the sum is over any orthonormal basis (υ ji) ji of the eigenspace of λi. Simi-
larly, since each vector υ ji gives a= λi, probability theory gives for all x,
P(a= λi|x) =∑
ji
P(υ ji |x). (6.225)
The nondegenerate case of the theorem (which distinguishes the states υ ji ) yields
Pψ(υ ji |x) = pψ(υ ji), (6.226)
from which (6.157) follows once again:
Pψ(a= λi|x) =∑
ji
Pψ(υ ji |x) =∑
ji
pψ(υ ji) = pψ(a= λi).
Our proof of the Colbeck–Renner Theorem is now complete. 
Under less stringent assumptions this theorem might have been regarded as the
conclusion of von Neumann’s program to disprove the possibility of completing
quantum mechanics by adding hidden variables, but as yet this seems unwarranted.
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Notes
§6.1. From von Neumann to Kochen–Specker
‘For decades nobody spoke up against von Neumann’s arguments, and his conclusions were
quoted by some as the gospel’. (Belinfante, 1973, pp. 24)
Theorem 6.2 is due to non Neumann (1932, §IV.2); it was the ﬁrst result to impose
useful constraints on hidden variable theories, anticipating all later literature on the
subject. Unfortunately (as part of their general anti-Copenhagen rhetoric), Bell and
his followers left the realm of decent academic discourse by calling von Neumann’s
arguments against hidden variables ‘silly’ and ‘foolish’, through which they merely
displayed the depth of their own misunderstanding of von Neumann’s reasoning; see
Caruana (1995), Bub (2011a), and especially Dieks (2016b). In fact, von Neumann
(1932, p. 172) carefully qualiﬁes his Theorem 6.2 by stating that it follows ‘im Rah-
men unserer Bedingungen’ (i.e. ‘given our assumptions’), of which he earlier (on
p. 164) admits that linearity is physically reasonable only for commuting operators,
but nonetheless justiﬁes this assumption through an ensemble argument (now out-
dated, but by no means ‘silly’). Though couched in agreeable academic parlance,
the earlier critique by Hermann (1935) was misguided, too (Dieks, 2016b).
The Kochen–Specker Theorem is due to Kochen & Specker (1967); the authors
were originally logicians. A similar but less precise statement had appeared earlier
in Bell (1966), who was not cited by Kochen and Specker; some authors refer to
the Bell–Kochen–Specker Theorem. The Nature assumption has been experimen-
tally veriﬁed, cf. Huang et al (2003). The proof of the fundamental Lemma 6.7 we
present is essentially due to Kochen and Specker, as simpliﬁed by Peres (1995). Our
independent proof for C4 is taken from Cabello et al (1996). Surveys of various
proofs are given by Brown (1992) and Gould (2009); see also Waegell & Aravind
(2012) and references therein, as well as Bub (1997) for another proof. From the
Netherlands, we cannot fail to mention the short proof by Gill & Keane (1996). For
geometric aspects (and even a link with M.C. Escher) see Zimba & Penrose (1993).
One ﬁnds two opposite directions of research around the Kochen–Specker The-
orem. A computational one, which seems hardly relevant to conceptual issues in
physics (the goal rather being The Guinness Book of Records), consists of attempts
to ﬁnd a minimal set of vectors that cannot be coloured. See, for example, Pavicic
et al (2005) for arbitrary dimension and Arends (2009) and Uijlen & Westerbaan
(2015) for R3, the latter paper showing that at least 22 vectors are needed.
The other, which is of signiﬁcant conceptual importance and hence is worth some
more extensive discussion, consists of attempts to ﬁnd a maximal set of vectors that
can be coloured. That is, one looks for large (preferably dense and measurable)
subsets S2c of S
2 for which there exists a function V˜ : S2c →{0,1} that satisﬁes:
• V˜ (−u) = V˜ (u) for each u ∈ S2c ;
• V˜ (u1) + V˜ (u2) + V˜ (u3) = 2, for each (orthonormal) basis (u1,u2,u3) of R3
whose elements lie in S2c .
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The ﬁrst result in this direction was obtained by Meyer (1999) and Havlicek et al
(2001), who showed that one may take S2c = S
2∩Q3; this choice was motivated by
invoking ﬁnite precision arguments to circumvent the Kochen–Specker Theorem,
see below. To write down a suitable function V˜ : S2 ∩Q3 → {0,1}, we ﬁrst deﬁne
an auxiliary function S : S2∩Q3 → Z by
S
(
n1
m1
,
n2
m2
,
n3
m3
)
=
n3
m3
· lcm(m1,m2,m3)
gcd(n1,n2,n3)
, (6.227)
where lcm is the least common multiple and gcd is the greatest common divisor of
the argument. This function is obviously well deﬁned. Then the following works:
V˜ (x,y,z) = 0 if S(x,y,z) is odd; (6.228)
V˜ (x,y,z) = 1 if S(x,y,z) is even. (6.229)
More generally, for an arbitrary n-dimensional) Hilbert space H, with n < ∞,
Clifton & Kent (2000) proved the existence of a countable dense colorable subset
P1(H)c of P1(H) (cf. Deﬁnition 6.9), with the additional property that different
resolutions of the identity drawn fromP1(H)c never share a projection (so that the
key strategy proof of Lemma 6.7, which is based on the existence of overlapping
bases, falls apart). Given some enumeration (e(1)i ),(e
(2)
i ), . . . of the countable set of
all resolutions of the identity drawn from P1(H)c, so that each (e
(k)
1 , . . . ,e
(k)
n ) is a
basis of H, k ∈ N, each possible coloring W =Wf bijectively corresponds to some
function f : N→{1, . . . ,n} through
Wf (e) = 1 if e= e
(k)
f (k); (6.230)
Wf (e) = 0 otherwise. (6.231)
Note that because of the total incompatibility of the projections, each e ∈P1(H)c
belongs to a unique resolution (e(k)i ), so that Wf is well deﬁned. The statistical pre-
dictions of quantum mechanics may then be recovered as follows. For each density
operator ρ ∈ D(H) we may deﬁne a probability measure μρ on the set nN of all
functions f : N→{1, . . . ,n} by imposing the conditions
μρ
(
{ f ∈ nN |Wf (e(k)i ) = λ (k)i ∀ i= 1, . . . ,n,k ∈ K}
)
=∏
k∈K
Tr
(
ρ
n
∏
i=1
[e(k)i = λ
(k)
i ]
)
,
(6.232)
where λ (k)i ∈ {0,1}, K ⊂ N is ﬁnite, and [e(k)i = λ (k)i ] is the projection onto the cor-
responding eigenspace H
λ (k)i
of the projection e(k)i (more generally, for a ∈ B(H)sa
we write [a = λ ] for the spectral projection eλ deﬁned by a and λ ∈ σ(a)). The
subset of nN in the argument of μρ is hereby declared measurable; existence and
uniqueness of the measure μρ on a suitable σ -algebra follow from the Kolmogorov
extension theorem of measure theory, which applies because the marginals (6.232)
satisfy the appropriate consistency conditions, cf. Hermens (2009) for details.
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This formula guarantees that the left-hand side vanishes if λ (k)i = 0 for each i,
and also if λ (k)i = 1 for more than one value of i. If K = {k0} is a singleton and
λ = (λ1, . . . ,λn), then the right-hand side (and hence the left-hand side) is the Born
probability for the outcome e(k0)i = λi for each i, i.e.,
μρ
(
{ f ∈ nN |Wf (e(k0)i ) = λi∀ i= 1, . . . ,n}
)
= Tr
(
ρ
n
∏
i=1
[e(k0)i = λi]
)
. (6.233)
Consequently, it is true by construction that for any admissible measurement in
quantum mechanics (in that all observables commute), i.e., for each k0 ∈ N, av-
eraging over the ‘hidden variable’ f ∈ nN reproduces the statistical predictions of
quantum mechanics. This success is achieved at a high cost, however:
• Two random variables e(k)i and e(k
′)
i′ are statistically independent (with respect to
μρ ) whenever k = k′, even though ‖e(k)i − e(k
′)
i′ ‖ may be arbitrarily small.
• For each f ∈ nN the associated coloring Wf is maximally discontinuous, in that
for each u ∈P1(H)c and each ε > 0 there is u′ ∈P1(H)c such that although
‖eu−eu′ ‖< ε one has Wf (eu) =Wf (eu′), so that in fact |Wf (eu)−Wf (eu′)|= 1.
These facts were noted by Clifton & Kent themselves, and Appleby (2005) proved
that they are a necessary feature of all constructions that involve sufﬁciently large
subsets ofP1(H) that can be colored.
Without challenging their mathematical signiﬁcance, these discontinuities un-
dermine any potential physical relevance such models might have, and this in turn
challenges the reason such models were introduced in the ﬁrst place (Meyer, 1999),
namely the (alleged) ﬁnite precision loophole of the Kochen–Specker Theorem.
The thrust of this loophole is that it would be an illusion for an experimentalist
like Alice to claim that she measures some observable a with inﬁnite accuracy;
in fact, given ε > 0 she might equally well measure some a′ with ‖a− a′‖ < ε .
Consequently, ﬁnding a dense colorable subset P1(H)c ⊂P1(H) should sufﬁce
for a hidden variable interpretation of quantum mechanics, since if Alice believes
she measures some projection e, the model assigns a value W (e′) to the projection
e′ ∈P1(H)c she actually measures (where e′ is selected by some algorithm that
is part of the theory itself, cf. Clifton & Kent (2000)), and presents that value to
Alice as the outcome of her measurement. However, owing to the discontinuities
just mentioned, this value is as arbitrary as the identiﬁcation of e′.
As emphasized by Barrett & Kent (2004), this arbitrariness, although perhaps
undesirable, does not by itself affect the ability of the Clifton–Kent model to repro-
duce the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. On the other hand, it would be
pretty awkward to have a theory whose individual value attributions are completely
arbitrary, especially since the ﬁnite precision argument is predicated on the idea that
observables close to the one Alice believes herself to measure (i.e., e) should have
approximately the same value as the one she actually does measure (namely, e′).
If this is not the case, her measurements are pointless and the hidden variable Wf
would be empirically inaccessible and hence truly “hidden” (Appleby, 2005).
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See also Hermens (2009, 2016). This last point applies to Corollary 6.12, which
would no longer be true if the set XA of all bases of R3 in Deﬁnition 6.11 would be
replaced by some subset XcA ⊂ XA drawn from a colorable subset S2c of S2. Each z ∈
XZ would then correspond to some coloring u → F˜(u,z) of S2c , which, by the above
discussion, would be maximally discontinuous and hence empirically inaccessible.
Nonetheless, such a theory does exist in principle.
The aim of maximizing colorable sets was pursued in a different direction by Bub
& Clifton (1996); see also Bub (1997). Given a “preferred” observable a ∈ B(H)sa
and a pure state e ∈P1(H), these authors look for a maximal sublatticeP(e,a) of
P(H) that contains all spectral projections of a (but, despite the notationP(e,a),
does not necessarily contain e!), admits sufﬁciently many lattice homomorphism
h : P(e,a) → {0,1} (i.e., binary valuations) such that the Born measure μe on
σ(a), i.e., μe(Δ) = Tr(eeΔ ), Δ ⊆ σ(a), can be reproduced by averaging over these
homomorphisms, and ﬁnally is invariant under all unitary isomorphisms of P(H)
that commute with both e and a. Equivalently, one wants a maximal C*-subalgebra
A(a,e) of B(H) that contains a, admits sufﬁciently many dispersion-free states so as
to reproduce the Born probabilities deﬁned by a in the given state e, and is invariant
in the said way (a fourth condition used by Bub and Clifton is superﬂuous; see Bub,
1997, p. 128). Asuming for simplicity that n= dim(H)< ∞, the answer is
A(a,e) =C∗(eλ eeλ ,λ ∈ σ(a))′ (6.234)
where, as always, eλ is the projection into the eigenspace Hλ for λ ∈ σ(a), and the
prime denotes the commutant (one might as well take the commutant of the set of all
eλ eeλ ). Equivalently, putting e= eψ = |ψ〉〈ψ|, eq. (6.234) is the C*-algebra gener-
ated by all projections fλ onto the nonzero components eλ ψ of ψ in each Hλ and all
one-dimensional projections that are orthogonal to all fλ (given that dim(H) < ∞,
this is the same as the linear span of these projections). Thus A(a,e) always contains
C∗(a), since it contains each eλ , λ ∈ σ(a)), but note that A(a,e) need not be com-
mutative. In comparison, if the requirement had been the reproduction of all Born
probabilities for arbitrary pure states e rather than for some given e, the answer
would have been any maximal abelian C*-algebra in B(H) that contains C∗(a); if a
has non-degenerate spectrum, this is just C∗(a) itself. The simplest possibility is
A(1H ,e) =C∗(e)′ = {e}′, (6.235)
which is the linear span of all projections f ∈P(H) for which either e ≤ f or
e ≤ 1H − f (i.e., if e = eψ , then either ψ ∈ fH or ψ ∈ ( fH)⊥). In other words, we
have a ∈ A(1H ,e) iff ψ is an eigenvector of a (i.e. the eigenvector-eigenvalue link).
Each dispersion-free state on A(a,e), or, equivalently, each homomorphism hλ :
P(e,a) → {0,1}, corresponds to one of the projections fλ through hλ ( fλ ) = 1
and hλ ( f ) = 0 for all other one-dimensional projections f in P(e,a). The Born
probabilities from e are then recovered by assigning (Born) measure Tr(e fλ ) to hλ .
Though interesting, this result mainly supports so-called modal interpretations of
quantum mechanics, which we reject, since they tell us nothing physical about the
measurement process and address the measurement problem only philosophically.
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§6.2. The Free Will Theorem
The Free Will Theorem was published in two versions by Conway & Kochen
(2006, 2009). Analogous results had previously been published by Heywood &
Redhead (1983), Stairs (1983), Brown & Svetlichny (1990), and Clifton (1993),
of which only the ﬁrst paper was cited by Conway and Kochen. Moreover, the
close relationship to Bell’s (1964) Theorem might well be insisted on as a topic that
should have been discussed in the original papers. Other critical literature (making
the points listed in the preamble to this chapter) includes Bassi & Ghirardi (2007), ‘t
Hooft (2007), Goldstein et al (2010), Wu¨thrich (2011), Hemmick & Shakur (2012),
Cator & Landsman (2014), Hermens (2014, 2015), and Walleczek (2016).
The original (Strong) Free Will Theorem (FWT) states that three assumptions,
called SPIN, TWIN, and MIN, imply that the response of a spin-one particle to the
bipartite experiment with spin-one particles described above ‘is not a function of
properties of that part of the universe that is earlier than this response (. . . ).’ Here
SPIN and TWIN are the ﬁrst and second half of our Nature axiom, whilst MIN ex-
presses a form of context-locality as well as the loose assumption that Alice and
Bob may ‘freely choose’ their settings a and b, respectively. Accordingly, in our
notation, Conway and Kochen only use the parameter space Z, rather than the full
space X we need in order to consistently axiomatize determinism. Their formulation
contains an implicit assumption of determinism, whose precise nature only becomes
clear from their proof, and which is akin to our formulation, except for the crucial
difference that the function they allude to only acts on the particle variables and not
on the settings of the experiment (of which, as already noted, Conway and Kochen
just say that the experimenters can ‘freely choose’ them).
Conway and Kochen paraphrase their theorem as follows:
‘if indeed we humans have free will, then elementary particles already have their own small
share of this valuable commodity. More precisely, if the experimenter can freely choose
the directions in which to orient his apparatus in a certain measurement, then the particles
response (to be pedantic—the universe’s response near the particle) is not determined by the
entire previous history of the universe. (. . . ) our theorem asserts that if experimenters have
a certain freedom, then particles have exactly the same kind of freedom. Indeed, it is natural
to suppose that this latter freedom is the ultimate explanation of our own. (. . . ) Granted our
three axioms [i.e., the physical ones and freedom of choice], the Free Will Theorem shows
that nature itself is nondeterministic.’
However, such far-reaching conclusions seem unwarranted by the actual technical
content of the theorem. Indeed, though it is also assumed in Bell’s ﬁrst theorem (see
§6.5 below), the conjunction of Determinism and Freedom is a priori is uncomfort-
able, especially since the main novelty of the FWT lies in the emphasis Conway and
Kochen (unlike Bell) put on free will. The authors acknowledge at least this point
already on the ﬁrst page of their ﬁrst paper (Conway & Kochen, 2006), in which
they anticipate criticism of the kind:
“‘I saw you put the ﬁsh in!” said a simpleton to an angler who had used a minnow to catch
a bass.’
Indeed, also after more serious philosophical analysis, it has been concluded that:
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‘Their [Conway & Kochen’s] case against determinism thus has all the virtues of theft over
honest toil. It is truly indeterminism in, indeterminism out.’ (Wu¨thrich, 2011)
Our formulation of the FWT, in which the original allusion to undeﬁned free will in
allowing arbitrary settings of the experiment has been replaced by complete deter-
minism including the settings, avoids this criticism.
To derive (6.35) - (6.38), we use (6.21) to write down the formulae
Pψ0(Fi = 1,Gj = 1|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0,(13−|ui〉〈ui|)⊗ (13−|v j〉〈v j|)ψ0〉;
Pψ0(Fi = 0,Gj = 0|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0, |ui〉〈ui|⊗ |v j〉〈v j|ψ0〉;
Pψ0(Fi = 1,Gj = 0|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0,(13−|ui〉〈ui|)⊗|v j〉〈v j|ψ0〉;
Pψ0(Fi = 0,Gj = 1|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0, |ui〉〈ui|⊗ (13−|v j〉〈v j|)ψ0〉.
For example, for any pair of unit vectors u,v we have
〈ψ0, |u〉〈u|⊗ |v〉〈v|ψ0〉=
1
3 〈e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2+ e3⊗ e3,u|⊗ |v〉〈v|(e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2+ e3⊗ e3)〉=
1
3 〈e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2+ e3⊗ e3,〈u,v〉u⊗v〉
= 13 〈u,v〉2,
which gives (6.36). The other cases are similar.
The implications of the ﬁnite precision loophole of the Kochen–Specker Theo-
rem for the Free Will Theorem were analyzed by Hermens (2014), who concluded
that this loophole does not apply. We give a more precise argument to this effect.
We have dense colorable subsets XcA ⊂ XA and XcB ⊂ XB = XA, where XcA may
or may not coincide with XcB. If not, the perfect correlation condition (6.54) in the
Nature assumption cannot even be stated, but even if XcA = X
c
B, since ﬁnite precision
of experiment has been declared to be an issue it would be quite out of character to
impose (6.54). Instead, one needs a probabilistic version of this condition, of which
it will turn out that it cannot be satisﬁed. As in the notes to the previous section, for
each density matrix ρ one needs a probability measure μρ on Z that reproduces the
statistical quantum-mechanical predictions for the associated quantum state. Com-
pared to the notes to the previous section, the role of W is now played by z, in that
for given F and G one might write
W (a,b) = (Fˆ(a,z), Gˆ(b,z). (6.236)
This measure may be constructed analogously to (6.232), i.e., for any sequence
(a(k)) of bases drawn from XcA, any sequence (b
(k)) of bases drawn from XcB, and any
sequences (λ (k)) and (γ(k)) in Λ , cf. (6.22), where k ∈ K ⊂N is arbitrary, we deﬁne
μρ({z ∈ Z | Fˆ(a(k),z) = λ (k), Gˆ(b(k),z) = γ(k),k ∈ K} =
∏
k∈K
Tr
(
ρ
3
∏
i, j=1
[J2ui = λ
(k)
i ] · [J2v j = γ
(k)
j ]
)
, (6.237)
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where, as in the main text,
a= (u1,u2,u3); (6.238)
b= (v1,v2,v3). (6.239)
Note that J2ui acts on Alice’s Hilbert space C
3 whilst J2v j acts on Bob’s. In particular,
for ﬁxed k0 ∈ K and λ ,γ ∈ Λ , we have the special case of (6.237) for compatible
measurements, viz.
μρ({z ∈ Z | Fˆ(a(k0),z) = λ , Gˆ(b(k0),z) = γ}= Tr
(
ρ
3
∏
i, j=1
[J2ui = λi] · [J2v j = λ j]
)
,
where in the main text we would have written Pρ(F = λ ,G= μ|A= a,B= b) for the
right-hand side. Hence for the correlated state ρ = |ψ0〉〈ψ0| we obtain from (6.42):
μψ0({z ∈ Z | Fˆi(a,z) = Gˆ j(b,z)}) = 23 (1−〈ui,v j〉2), (6.240)
which of course vanishes if ui = v j. If the expression 1−〈ui,v j〉2 appearing here is
small, then the projections eui and ev j are close (in norm), since
‖eui − ev j‖2 ≤ 2(1−〈ui,v j〉2). (6.241)
Eq. (6.240) therefore allows us to make rigorous sense of Hermens’ (2014) heuristic
idea that the assumption (6.54) in the FWT should be modiﬁed as follows:
‘if ‖eui − ev j‖ is small, then in most of the cases Fˆi(a,z) = Gˆ j(b,z).’
Namely, we replace (6.54) by the following approximate correlation condition:
• For every ε > 0 there is δ > 0 such that if 1−〈ui,v j〉2 < δ , then
μψ0({z ∈ Z | Fˆi(a,z) = Gˆ j(b,z)})< ε. (6.242)
Indeed, if the theory existed, on could simply take δ = ε . However, a theory satis-
fying (6.242) does not exist, as can be proved by contradiction: if Fˆi(a,z) = Gˆ j(b,z)
for all pairs (ui,v j) such that 1− 〈ui,v j〉2 < ε , then the proof of Theorem 6.13
shows not only that (6.32) still holds on the modiﬁed Nature assumption (so that
F˜(·,z) again deﬁnes a coloring of S2), but that in addition we have
1−〈u,u′〉2 < δ ⇒ F˜(u,z) = F˜(u′,z). (6.243)
In particular, the apparently weaker correlation condition ending with (6.242) is
actually stronger than its exact counterpart (6.54).
Thus Theorem 6.13 still holds on this revised Nature assumption, so that unlike
the Kochen–Specker Theorem, the Free Will Theorem is immune to the ﬁnite pre-
cision loophole. The price for this immunity is that, quite against the spirit of the
FWT, some probabilistic reasoning had to be invoked, so that the difference between
the FWT and Bell’s ﬁrst theorem has blurred even further.
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§6.3. Philosophical intermezzo: Free will in the Free Will Theorem
The literature on free will is immense. Introductory accounts include Walter
(2001), which focuses on the connection with neuroscience, Doyle (2011), and
Beebee (2013), the second of which remains largely philosophical, the third even
completely. A very sophisticated recent defense of compatibilism is Ismael (2016).
Lewis’s ‘local miracle compatibilism’ was proposed in Lewis (1981). What’s more:
‘[Lewis’s paper is] the ﬁnest essay that has ever been written in defense of compatibilism—
possibly the ﬁnest essay that has ever been written about any aspect of the free will problem.’
(van Inwagen, 2008).
Saunders (1968) already made a point similar to Lewis’s; see also Moore (1912, Ch.
6). For Lewis’s theory of counterfactuals see Lewis (1973, 1979, 2000), as well as
Menzies (2014). See also Fischer (1994), Beebee (2003, 2013), and Vihvelin (2013).
Although Lewis’s position is called local miracle compatbilism, a miracle takes
place neither in the actual world where Alice’s hand is at rest nor in the possible
world where she raises it, i.e., a law is broken neither in the former nor in the latter:
‘This is what Lewis means by a ‘miracle’: an event M is a miracle if and only if M occurs
at possible world w, and M is contrary to some actual law (or combination of laws) L. The
point here is that while M is a miracle in Lewis’s sense, it is not contrary to any of w’s laws
of nature. At w, L simply isn’t a law in the ﬁrst place. So, as things actually happened—
in the actual world—L is a law, and m does not occur, so there is no miracle in the usual
sense of ‘miracle’. m is only a ‘miracle’ in Lewis’s special sense of ‘miracle’: something
(m) happens in w that is contrary to the laws of nature in the actual world.’
(Beebee, 2013, p. 62)
Unfortunately, confusion may arise if the quotation in the main text ‘if I did it, a law
would be broken’ from Lewis (1981) is subjected to the following explanation:
‘On Lewis’s account of counterfactuals, the truth conditions for counterfactuals—what
makes them true—are as follows. Suppose we have the counterfactual ‘if A had been the
case, B would have been the case’ (so if A is ‘I miss the bus’ and B is ‘I’m late’, this coun-
terfactual just says, ‘if I’d missed the bus, I would have been late’). This counterfactual will
be true if and only if, at the closest possible world to the actual world at which A is true, B
is also true. So, our sample counterfactual, ‘if I’d missed the bus, I would have been late’,
is true if and only if: at the closest possible world to the actual world at which I miss the
bus, I’m late.’ (Beebee, 2013, p. 60).
Removing any possible remaining doubt, on p. 62 she mentions that the closest
possible world where I miss the bus is the world w. According to this explanation,
then, Lewis’s sentence ‘if I did it, a law would be broken’, would mean that at the
closest possible world to the actual world in which I did it, a law is broken, i.e., in w.
But according to Beebee’s deﬁnition quoted in the main text of what Lewis means
by a miracle, apparently this is not the right reading (and indeed it would, in our
view, be nonsensical). Moreover, Lewis (1981) emphasizes that in the ﬁrst bullet
point in the main text above—which he defends—it is not the agent who would
break a law, whereas in the second bullet point —rejected by Lewis—it is; in the
ﬁrst it is the breaking of some law at an earlier time that enables the agent to do
what she, in our actual world, did not do. Thus Lewis’s phrasing seems awkward.
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Our development of Lewis’s argument is indebted to Vihvelin (2013, pp. 164–
165), who (re)states Lewis’s ﬁrst bullet point as the following conjunction:
1. Slightly Different Past: If I had raised my hand, the past would still have been
exactly the same until shortly before the time of my decision.
2. Slightly Different Laws: If I had raised my hand, the laws would have been ever
so slightly different in a way that permitted a divergence from the lawful course
of actual history shortly before the time of my decision.
A second way in which Alice could (counterfactually) have raised here hand is
through an instant (counterfactual) modiﬁcation of the state of the world, as in Ben-
nett (1984). This has been explicated by Vihvelin (2013, p. 165), too:
1. Same Laws: If I had raised my hand, the laws would still have been the same.
2. Completely Different Past: If I had raised my hand, past history would have
been different all the way back to the Big Bang.
Here we prefer to write Different Past, since even though in this scenario the state
indeed (by determinism) would have been different all the way back to the Big Bang,
the entire trajectory of the world may or may not be close to the actual one. In this
scenario, the two cases Lewis distinguishes take the form in the main text.
Since the main novelty of their papers lies in the emphasis on free will, the reader
might wonder what Conway & Kochen themselves have to say about the subject. As
we can read in the delightful biography of Conway by Roberts (2015), or watch in
his video lectures on the Free Will Theorem (Conway, 2009), free will is indeed of
great importance to at least the ﬁrst author of the theorem. Unfortunately, his interest
in free will seems unaccompanied by any philosophical sophistication, e.g.:
‘Compatibilism in my view is silly. Sorry, I shouldn’t just say straight off that it is silly.
Compatibilism is an old viewpoint from previous centuries when philosophers were talking
about free will. The were accustomed to physical theory being deterministic. And then
there’s the question: How can we have free will in this deterministic universe? Well, they
sat and thought for ages and ages and ages and read books on philosophy and God knows
what and they came up with compatibilism, which was a tremendous wrenching effect to
reconcile 2 things which seemed incompatible. And they said they were compatible after
all. But nobody would ever have come up with compatibilism if they thought, as turns out
to be the case, that science wasn’t deterministic. The whole business of compatibilism was
to reconcile what science told you at the time, centuries ago down to 1 century ago: Science
appeared to be totally deterministic, and how can we reconcile that with free will, which
is not deterministic? So compatibilism, I see it as out of date, really. It’s doing something
that doesn’t need to be done. However, compatibilism hasn’t gone out of date, certainly,
as far as the philosophers are concerned. Lots of them are still very keen on it. How can
I say it? If you do anything that seems impossible, you’re quite proud when you appear
to have succeeded. And so really the philosophers don’t want to give up this notion of
compatibilism because it seems to damned clever. But my view is it’s really nonsense. And
it’s not necessary. So whether it actually is nonsense or not doesn’t matter.’
(Conway, quoted in Roberts, 2015, pp. 361–362).
Finally, our version of van Inwagen’s (1975) Consequence Argument is due to
Beebee (2003), and the novel parts of this section are based on Landsman (2016c).
For interesting philosophical criticism of this approach, see De Mola (2016).
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§6.4. Technical intermezzo: The GHZ-Theorem
The GHZ Theorem appeared in Greenberger et al (1990) See also Clifton, Red-
head, & Butterﬁeld (1991) and Bub (1997). Innumerable variations on and gen-
eralizations of such arguments may be given, leading to equally many Free Will
Theorems. All of these have their roots in algebraic properties of matrices, which
hidden variable theories (in vain) try to reproduce.
§6.5. Bell’s theorems
The original contributions to the theme of this section are Bell (1964, 1976), of
which the ﬁrst is one of the most famous papers of 20th century theoretical physics.
Since there are more than 10,000 papers citing Bell (1964) alone, it is impossible
to discuss all literature relevant to Bell’s work. What we call his ﬁrst theorem orig-
inates with Bell (1964), which incidentally was written after Bell (1966), but our
treatment of the settings (taken from Cator & Landsman, 2014) is different. Though
originally motivated as an attempt to make the Free Will Theorem look less of a pe-
titio principii, it also addresses a problem Bell faced even according to some of his
staunchest supporters (Norsen, 2009; Seevinck & Ufﬁnk, 2011), namely the tension
between the idea that the hidden variables (in the pertinent causal past) should on
the one hand include all ontological information relevant to the experiment, but on
the other hand should leave Alice and Bob free to choose any settings they like.
His second theorem comes from Bell (1976), followed by Bell (1990a).
Apart from his own papers, which are reprinted in Bell, Gottfried & Veltman (2001),
treatments of Bell’s Theorems we regard as sound include Fine (1982), Jarrett
(1984), Pitowsky (1989), van Fraassen (1991), Butterﬁeld (1992a,b), Bub (1997),
Werner, & Wolf (2001), Liang, Spekkens, & Wiseman (2011), Shimony (2013),
Wiseman (2014), and Brown & Timpson (2015). Recent and mathematically inno-
vative approaches include Abramsky & Brandenburger (2011), Acı´n et al (2015),
and Fritz (2016). For history, see Gilder (2008) and Kaiser (2010).
Unfortunately, we have not been able to come to grips with (and hence do not
cite) literature claiming that Bell’s theorems are false, or have nothing to do with
hidden variables, or prove that quantum mechanics (if not nature itself!) is nonlocal
per se, or that he never changed his mind and only has one theorem saying it all.
The veriﬁcation of (6.102) - (6.105) is analogous to the above computations de-
riving (6.35) - (6.38). In terms of the unit vector
va =
(
cosa
sina
)
, (6.244)
the observable F Alice measures on setting A = a is the projection ea = |va〉〈va|,
and similarly for Bob. Hence the corresponding Born probabilities are given by
Pψ0(F = 1,G= 1|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0,ea⊗ ebψ0〉;
Pψ0(F = 0,G= 0|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0,(12− ea)⊗ (12− eb)ψ0〉;
Pψ0(F = 1,G= 0|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0,ea⊗ (12− eb)ψ0〉;
Pψ0((F = 0,G= 1|A= a,B= b) = 〈ψ0,(12− ea)⊗ ebψ0〉.
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For example, we have
〈ψ0,ea⊗ ebψ0〉 = 12 〈e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2, |va〉〈va|⊗ |vb〉〈vb|(e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2)〉
= 12 〈e1⊗ e1+ e2⊗ e2,(cosacosb+ sinasinb)va⊗ vb〉
= 12 (cosacosb+ sinasinb)
2
= 12 cos
2(a−b).
The CHSH-inequality (6.117) is due to Clauser, Horne, Shimony, & Holt (1969).
The deﬁnitive (i.e., loophole-free) experimental veriﬁcation of its violation in nature
is Henson et al. (2015). A direct proof starts of (6.117) from the simpler inequality
P(F = H)≤ P(F = G)+P(G = H), (6.245)
for three {0,1}-valued random variables F,G,H, which implies (6.117). To prove
(6.245), one just writes
P(F = H) = P(F = 1,G= 1,H = 0)+P(F = 1,G= 0,H = 0)
+ P(F = 0,G= 1,H = 1)+P(F = 0,G= 0,H = 1),
etc., and notes that each term on the left-hand side of (6.245) also occurs on the right-
hand side. Since each term lies in [0,1] and hence is positive, this implies (6.245).
Our proof of Proposition 6.17 follows Werner & Wolf (2001), as does our proof of
Theorem 6.18 (though not our formulation thereof, which once again derives from
Cator & Landsman (2014). This proof shows that, as ﬁrst noted by Fine (1982) and
analyzed more deeply in Butterﬁeld (1992b), there is no real distinction between
the possibility of reproducing given (empirical) probabilities P(F = λ ,G = γ|A =
a,B= b) that satisfy Bell locality by a local deterministic hidden variable theory or
by a local stochastic hidden variable theory. Most current research in this direction,
sparked by Popescu & Rohlich (1994), is therefore concerned with theories deﬁned
by formal joint conditional probabilities that satisfy a no signaling condition like OI
instead of Bell locality, cf. Bub (2011b) and Brunner et al (2014) for reviews.
Formal conditional probabilities of the kind that Bell’s second theorem uses have
been axiomatized by e.g. Popper (1938) and Re´nyi (1955); the following axioms are
theorems if conditional probabilities are deﬁned a` la Kolmogorov by (1.1). Let Σ be
some σ -algebra and let F ⊂ Σ\{ /0} be an ideal in Σ in the sense that if B ∈ Σ and
C ∈F , then B∩C ∈F . A conditional probability on (Σ ,F ) is a map
P : Σ ×F → [0,1]; (6.246)
(A,C) → P(A|C), (6.247)
such that:
1. For each C ∈F the map A → P(A|C) is a probability measure on Σ ;
2. P(A∩B|C) = P(A|B∩C) ·P(B|C), for each A,B ∈ Σ and C ∈F .
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Van Fraassen (1991) noted that if (6.121) holds, then the variable x is a common
cause in the sense of Reichenbach for Alice’s and Bob’s outcomes (see Hofer-Szabo´
(2015) for a recent paper in this direction). To explain this observation, suppose two
random processes F and G (like Alice’s and Bob’s measurements) are correlated,
i.e., P(F = λ ,G= γ) = P(F = λ )P(G= γ). What might cause the correlation?
1. Chance. If Alice and Bob independently throw dice but always get the same
result, there is a computable nonzero probability for this to happen without any
reason. But this probability decreases as the number of occurrences grows.
2. Causation. One outcome inﬂuences or even determines the other. Maybe Bob,
whose experiment is genuinely random, is able to manipulate Alice’s experiment
once he has seen his outcome. But according to relativity theory or other basic
notions of causality in space-time, this should be impossible if Alice and Bob
perform their measurements simultaneously and far from each other.
3. Ur-determinism. The initial conditions at the Big Bang plus deterministic Laws
of Nature imply the correlation. However, physics becomes pointless if we en-
dorse this option. The notion of explanation as the purpose of science is defeated
and there is little difference between this argument and Divine Predestination.
4. Identity. The motions of my mirror image are strongly correlated with me, but
that is because this image is really the same as me (at least in so far as motion is
concerned, as opposed to e.g. thoughts). This example might also be explained
using causation. Another example consists of Alice and Bob ﬁlming the same
random process (which may also be explained using the following concept).
5. Common Cause A random process X is said to be a common cause for two
correlated random processes if it precedes both and satisﬁes
P(F = λ ,G= γ|X = x) = P(F = λ |X = x)P(G= γ|X = x). (6.248)
Another way to write this is P(F = λ |G = γ,X = x) = P(F = λ |X = x), which
shows that a common cause X screens off the dependence of F on G. Often the
common cause is hidden and has to be inferred from the observed correlation
(having excluded other explanations, like the ones above). A nice example of
this is the inference of a manuscript called Q in New Testament studies. It is
clear that the Gospels of Matthew and Luke both draw on Mark, but they also
contain strikingly similar or even identical non-Markan passages. For various
reasons it is unlikely that either one copied these from the other, so that the main
hypothesis is that they both rely on Q, which is now lost. See e.g. Mack (1993).
From this perspective, the amazing fact is that the correlations in the Alice and
Bob experiment with either spin-1 particle or photons cannot be explained by a
common cause, since its existence (in the form of x) would imply the Bell inequality.
However, of the four other explanations described above, no. 1 is ridiculous given
the statistics of the relevant experiments, no. 2 is at odds with relativity, and no.
4 seems inapplicable. This leaves no. 3, which seems only supported by ’t Hooft
(2016), who denies the independence assumptions (i.e. between the settings and the
state of the pair of particles undergoing measurement) lying at the basis of both the
Free Will Theorem and Bell’s theorems. Every way you look at it you lose!
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Generalizations of Theorem 6.19 to operator algebras were given e.g. by Baez
(1987), Raggio (1988), Werner (1989), and Bacciagaluppi (1993), as follows. Let A
and B be unital C*-algebras, with projective tensor product A⊗ˆB (i.e., the comple-
tion of the algebraic tensor product A⊗B in the maximal C*-cross-norm), cf. §C.13;
the choice of the projective tensor product guarantees that each state on A⊗B ex-
tends to a state on A⊗ˆB by continuity; conversely, since A⊗B is dense in A⊗ˆB, each
state on the latter is uniquely determined by its values on the former. In particular,
product states ρ⊗σ and mixtures ω =∑i piρi⊗σi thereof are well deﬁned on A⊗ˆB.
If A ⊂ B(H1) and B ⊂ B(H2) are von Neumann algebras, and all states considered
are normal, it is easier to work with the spatial tensor product A⊗B, deﬁned as the
double commutant (or weak completion) of A⊗B in B(H1⊗H2). Any normal state
on A⊗B extends to a normal state on A⊗B by continuity. Below we use ⊗ˆ, but the
results also work for ⊗. In what follows, A and B are unital C*-algebras.
Deﬁnition 6.23. Let ω be a state on A⊗ˆB.
1. A product state is a state of the form ω = ρ⊗σ , i.e., ω is deﬁned by linear (and
continuous) extension of ω(a⊗b) = ρ(a)σ(b).
2. A state ω is uncorrelated when it is in the w∗-closure of the convex hull of the
product states on A⊗ˆB. In particular, states ω = ∑i piρi⊗σi, where pi > 0 and
∑i pi = 1, are uncorrelated (w∗-convergent inﬁnite sums are allowed here).
3. A state is correlated when it is not uncorrelated.
An uncorrelated state ω is pure precisely when it is a product of pure states. This
has the important consequence that both its restrictions ω|A and ω|B to A and B,
respectively, are pure as well (the restriction ω|A of a state ω on A⊗ˆB to, say, A is
given by ω|A(a) = ω(a⊗1B), where 1B is the unit element of B, etc.). A correlated
pure state has the property that its restriction to A or B is mixed.
Proposition 6.24. The following conditions are equivalent:
• Each state on A⊗ˆB is uncorrelated;
• Each pure state on A⊗ˆB is a product state;
• At least one of the C*-algebras A and B is commutative.
For the proof see Takesaki (2002), Theorem 4.14.
Corollary 6.25. Correlated states exist iff A and B are both noncommutative.
As one might expect, this result is closely related to the Bell inequalities:
Proposition 6.26. For any ω ∈ S(A⊗ˆB), the following conditions are equivalent:
• ω is uncorrelated.
• For all self-adjoint operators a1,a2 ∈ A and b1,b2 ∈ B of norm ≤ 1 we have
|ω(a1(b1+b2)+a2(b1−b2))| ≤ 2. (6.249)
See Baez (1987), Raggio (1988), Bacciagaluppi (1993), and Landsman (2006a).
Corollary 6.27. If A or B is commutative, then (6.249) holds for all states ω .
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An elegant geometric approach to the Bell inequalities was developed by Pitowsky
(1989, 1994), which we now summarize (also cf. Werner & Wolf, 2001).
Suppose we have a bipartite experiment with m different settings A = a1, . . .am
and B = b1, . . . ,bm on each wing, and binary outcomes, i.e., in {0,1}. We now de-
note the probability P(F = 1|A= ai) that F(ai) (i.e. the particular property measured
by experiment F at setting ai) is true by pi (i= 1, . . . ,m), and likewise we write p j+m
for P(G|B = b j), i.e., the probability that G(b j) is true, once again for j = 1, . . . ,m.
Furthermore, we abbreviate the probability that F(ai) and G(b j) are both true by
pi, j+m ≡ P(F = 1,G= 1|A= ai,B= b j) (i, j = 1, . . . ,m). (6.250)
The 2m+m2 “surface probabilities” p=(p1, . . . , p2m, p1,m+1, . . . , pm,2m) form a vec-
tor in R2m+m
2
, which we wish to constrain by the following assumption: there
is a fact of the matter underlying each experiment according to which the pair
(F(ai),G(b j)) already had a truth value for each possible setting (ai,b j), indepen-
dently of any measurement being carried out or not (“local realism”). Thus the
probabilities p (which now arguably have an ignorance interpretation) must lie in
the convex polytope in R|2m+m2| deﬁned as the convex hull Cm of the following set
of (extreme) points: for each 2m-tuple λ = (λ1, . . . ,λ2m), where λi ∈ {0,1}, deﬁne
xλ = (λ1, . . . ,λ2m,λ1 ·λm+1, . . . ,λm ·λ2m) ∈ R2m+m
2
, (6.251)
i.e., the entry at place k is λk (k = 1, . . . ,2m) and the entry at place (i, j) is λi ·λm+ j,
where i, j = 1, . . . ,m. The interpretation of this is that xλ represents the particular
fact of the matter where F(ai) has truth value λi and G(b j) has truth value λm+ j,
so that their conjunction (F(ai),G(b j)) has truth value λi · λm+ j. In this state the
probability of the said conﬁguration is one and all other states have probability zero;
arbitrary probability assignments then lie in Cm. The point, then, is to characterize
the convex polytope Cm ⊂ R2m+m2 through a ﬁnite set of inequalities, which turn
out to be generalized Bell inequalities. Seeing this result requires some background.
LetV be a real topological vector space with (continuous) dualV ∗; ifV =Rn we
may also put V ∗ = Rn and write ϕ(v) as an inner product 〈ϕ,v〉 in what follows.
1. Any (not necessarily convex) subset S⊂V has a polar So ⊂V ∗ deﬁned by
So = {ϕ ∈V ∗ | ϕ(v)≤ 1∀v ∈ S}, (6.252)
which is a closed convex subset ofV ∗. If S= K is a compact convex set, we have
Ko = {ϕ ∈V ∗ | ϕ(v)≤ 1∀v ∈ ∂eK}. (6.253)
2. The bipolar theorem (cf. e.g. Simon (2011, Theorem 5.5) states that
Soo = co(S∪{0}). (6.254)
In particular, if K a closed convex set containing the origin, then
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Koo = K, (6.255)
and hence, if Ko is a compact convex set, we may reconstruct K from Ko as
K = {v ∈V | ϕ(v)≤ 1∀ϕ ∈ ∂eKo}. (6.256)
3. In particular, if K is a convex polytope in a ﬁnite-dimensional vector space con-
taining the origin, then so is Ko. In that case, ∂eKo is a ﬁnite set and so points in K
are characterized by a ﬁnite set of linear inequalities (6.256), which describe the
faces of the polytope. In this case, the associated (dual) description of K is called
the Minkowski–Weyl Theorem, see e.g. Paffenholz (2010) for applications.
For example, among the ﬁve Platonic solids (i.e. in R3) the cube and the octahedron
are dual to each other, as are the dodecahedron and the icosahedron, whereas the
terahedron is self-dual. A propos, the latter arises as the convex polytope C1 for
m = 1 in the above story: clearly 2m+m2 = 3, and for the vertices of C1 one takes
the four points xλ ensuing from the four possibilities λ = (0,0),(1,0),(0,1),(1,1),
i.e., xλ = (0,0,0),(1,0,0),(0,1,0),(1,1,1). Then the inequalities in (6.256) are
p1,2 ≥ 0, p1 ≥ p1,2, p2 ≥ p1,2, p1+ p2− p1,2 ≤ 1. (6.257)
For m = 2 the ensuing convex polytope C2 ⊆ R8 is the convex hull of 16 extreme
points, whose inequalities may be found in Pitowsky (1989, p. 27); these imply the
CHSH inequality, whose violation in quantum mechanics therefore shows that the
probabilities in question have no local realistic model.
More generally, suppose we have n yes-no experiments (E1, . . . ,En) and some
subset Sn of the set {(i,k) | 1 ≤ i < k ≤ n} (above we had n = 2m, Ei = F(ai) for
i= 1, . . . ,m, Em+ j =G(b j) for j= 1, . . . ,m, and Sn = {(i,m+ j) | 1≤ i, j≤m}). This
gives surface probabilities (p1, . . . , pn, pi,k), where (i,k) ∈ Sn), which form a vector
p in Rn+|Sn|. As in (6.251), each truth assignment λ = (λ1, . . . ,λn), λ ∈ {0,1}, then
deﬁnes a point xλ ∈ Rn+|Sn| with coordinates (λ1, . . . ,λn,λi ·λk), where once again
(i,k) ∈ Sn. This set of 2n points in turn spans a convex polytope CSn characterized
by inequalities following from the dual characterization (6.256). Classical thinking
would constrain the p so as to lie in CSn , and indeed we have p ∈CSn iff there is a
probability space (X ,G,μ) such that pi = μ(Ai) and pi,k = μ(Ai ∩Ak) for certain
events Ai ∈ Σ , cf. Theorem 2.3 in Pitowsky (1989), which is based on Fine (1982).
Some authors claim on this basis that Bell-type inequalities have nothing to do
with physics, but surely the point is that some physical assumptions (notably local
realism) have to be made in order to justify the “classical thinking” behind CSn .
§6.6. The Colbeck–Renner Theorem
This section is based on Colbeck & Renner (2011, 2012a, 2012b), where the
main idea originates (alas with unclear assumptions and at best heuristic “proofs”),
Braunstein & Caves (1990), who provided steps 1 and 2 of the proof, and Landsman
(2015), whom we follow closely. See also Leegwater (2016) for a technically dif-
ferent approach (by a far more complicated argument, Leegwater seems to manage
to do without our CP assumption, i.e., continuity of probabilities).
